P.K. Balasubramanyan, J.

The defendants in O.S.60 of 1989 on the file of the Munsiff's Court of Hari pad are the petitioners. That suit was filed by the respondents herein for eviction of the defendants from plaint A schedule item No. 2 shed with arrears of rent and compensation for use and occupation. There was also a prayer for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from altering the shed described as plaint A schedule item No. 2 and from trespassing into plaint A schedule item No. 1. According to the plaintiff, in the year 1975, plaintiff No.1 let out the shed to defendant No. 1. Defendant No.1 had unauthorisedly permitted defendant No. 2 to run a tailoring shop in the premises. The suit was filed after termination of the tenancy and exchange of notices. The entire property, which according to the plaintiffs, have come to plaintiff No. 1 was scheduled as plaint A schedule item No.1 and the shed alleged let out to defendant No.1 on daily rent, was scheduled as A schedule item No. 2.

2. In the written statement filed, the defendants interalia raised a plea that what was leased out was 2.50 cents of land, originally to the father of the first defendant in the year 1950 on a ground rent of Rs. 24 per year and for the purpose of commercial use, that the father of defendant No.1 had put up the shed and was conducting a teashop in that shed and the lease of the shed set up in the plaint was not true. Defendants contended that they were entitled to the protection of S.106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. An issue was raised in the suit on the question whether the defendants are entitled to get protection under S.106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act and whether a reference under S.125(3) of the Act has to be made to the Land Tribunal for a decision on that question.

3. The defendants insisted that the question whether the defendants are entitled to protection of S.106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act is a question that comes within the purview of sub-ss.(1) and (3) of S.125 of the Act and hence that question required to be referred to the Land Tribunal since there was an ouster of the jurisdiction of the trial court in deciding that question. The plaintiffs opposed this prayer contending that a question whether a person was protected by S.106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act did not require to be referred to the Land Tribunal since such a question did not come within the ambit of S.125(3) of the Act. The trial Court took the view that the question whether the defendants are entitled to the protection of S.106 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act was not required to be referred to the Land Tribunal under S.125(3) of the Act in the light of the decision of the High Court in Muhammed Shaheer v. Nanu Vidyadharan (1990 (1) KLJ 690 =1990 (1) KLT SN 89 P. 70). The trial Court therefore took the view that it can, by itself, decide the question without making a reference to the Land Tribunal. It is this order of the trial court that is challenged in this Civil Revision Petition.

4. When the Civil Revision Petition came up before a learned Single Judge, it was submitted on behalf of the defendants that the decision in Muhammed Shaheer v. Nanu Vidyadharan (1990 (1) KLJ 690 =1990 (1) KLT SN 89 P. 70) runs counter to the decision in Chidambaram v. Arunachalam, (1978 KLT 571) and the decisions approving it and the Court below was in error in following the decision in Muhammed Shaheer v. Nanu Vidyadharan (1990 (1) KLJ 690 =1990 (1) KLT SN 89 P. 70). The learned judge felt that the decision in Muhammed Shaheer v. Nanu Vidyadharan (1990 (1) KLJ 690 =1990 (1) (KLT SN 89 P. 70) was inconsistent with the decision in Ramadas v. Krishnan, (1984 KLT 371) and Narayanan v. Parukutty Amma (1986 KLT 1340) and the matter had to be considered by a Division Bench. Thus the question that has been referred for decision is the correctness of the decision in Muhammed Shaheer v. Nanu Vidyadharan (1990 (1) KLJ 690 =1990 (1) KLT SN 89 P. 70). If that decision wer