The main legal point established in the judgment is the application of the limitation period under S.34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the proviso to the limitation period, and S.14(2) of the Limitation Act in the context of arbitration proceedings, emphasizing the exclusion of the period of delay and the requirement of good faith in initiating the proceedings.

M.R. Mariharan Nair, J.

The petitioners are respondents 1 and 2 in a proceeding filed under S.34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, which is presently pending before the District Court, Kozhikode.

2. The case was originally filed in the District Court, Kozhikode and it was later on found that in view of the intervention of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act in the place of the erstwhile Arbitration Act, the case was filed in the wrong forum and that it had no jurisdiction. The order directing re-presentation of the case before District Court reached this Court in C-R.P. No. 2232/99. It was found as per order dated 12.11.1999 that the order directing return was proper and correct. As regards the contention that the proceeding was not initiated in the sub court in good faith, it was observed that the question need not be considered in the revision and that if it is raised before the District Court when the proceedings are re-presented, that can be considered there. As per a subsequent order passed in the same proceeding in C.M.P. No. 5324/99 it was clarified that the aspect of good faith, if raised as above, will have to be considered unhampered by any of the observations contained in the aforesaid order of this Court. Subsequently, the question was, in fact, raised before the District Court in connection with the condonation of delay. As per the order impugned in the present revision, the District Court found that the prosecution of the case before the Sub Court was, in fact, done in good faith and that there was no question of any delay, in so far as the period from 10.3.1999 till 27.10.1999 is liable to be excluded while computing the period of limitation.

3. Sri. K.T. Sankaran, who argued the case of the petitioner, repeated his stand that the proceedings were initiated in the Sub Court with full knowledge that the proceedings were before the wrong forum and that in the circumstances, there was no question of any extension. According to him, there is total delay of 139 days involved in the presentation of the case before the District Court and the District Court erred in finding that the proceedings were within time.

4. For a proper disposal of the matter reference to certain dates are necessary. The award in question was passed on 10.2.1999. Copy of the award was obtained by the first respondent on 18.2.1999. The presentation of the O.P. before the Sub Court, Kozhikode seeking to set aside the award was on 10.3.1999. It was on 31.8.1999 that the 1st respondent filed I.A. 4662/99 seeking return of the O.P. for presentation before the proper court. On 30.9.1999 the Sub Court allowed the petition. O.P. was represented in the District Court, Kozhikode on 27.10.1999.

5. It is not in dispute that under S.34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 an application for setting aside the award has to be made within three months from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under S.33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral Tribunal. The said period of limitation is subject to a proviso which prescribes that if the court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months, it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.

6. S.14(2) of the Limitation Act provides as follows:-"14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide on court without jurisdiction.

xxx xxx xxx xxx

(2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable