The main legal point established in the judgment is that the accused can raise the plea of the applicability of S.197 at any stage of the proceedings, and there must be a reasonable connection between the act and the discharge of official duty for S.197 to apply.

1. Leave granted.

2. The appellant is a public servant and on 26.4.1993, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate asked for an explanation from him as to why the encroachment in question is not being removed, notwithstanding the direction of the High Court. The said Sub-Divisional Magistrate, by order dated 25th of June, 1993, appointed the appellant as a Duty Magistrate and one Shri. Vinod Pal Singh as Senior in-charge Magistrate of the police force, who were required to remove the encroachment in question. The said appellant visited the encroachment site and requested the encroachers for removal of encroachment and on 16.7.1993 was able to remove the encroachment partially and reported the said fact to his senior officer, but on 17.7.1993, when the appellant along with armed force, reached the encroachment site, several miscreants armed with weapons, started hurling stones and as the situation became out of control, after giving due warning, the appellant was compelled to give order for opening fire and disperse the mob. On account of such firing, one of the persons died and two others were injured and the appellant then sent a report to his senor officer about the incident. The son of the deceased, who is respondent No. 2, filed a complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, alleging commission of offence by the appellant under S.302, 307, 380, 427, 504,147,148 and 149 IPC as well as S.27 of the Arms Act. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, by his order dated 24.11.1995, came to the conclusion that there is sufficient evidence available to establish that prima facie case, under S.302, 307, 147, 148, 149 and 380, is made out against the accused and, therefore, he directed issuance of non-bailable warrants against the appellant and other accused persons. The Chief Judicial Magistrate was also of the opinion that the provisions of S.197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure will have no application to the facts of the case. The appellant then, moved the High Court under S.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, praying inter alia that no cognizance could be taken without a sanction of the appropriate Government, as required under sub-s. (2) of S.197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, when the appellant was discharging his official duty, pursuant to an order of the competent authority. The High Court, however, without going into the merits of the matter and being of the opinion that all the questions may be raised at the time of framing of charge, disposed of the application, filed by the appellant and hence the present appeal in this Court. It may be stated that there was a dispute between two sets of Mohamedan residents, one set complaining against the other about the encroachment of the property, belonging to the mosque, and the appellant as the Circle Inspector, on the basis of the said complaint had inquired into the matter and on the basis of a detailed inquiry, a finding had been arrived at, that the situation at the site was volatile for which on 27th of March, 1991, order under S.144 Cr.P.C. had been promulgated. Thereafter, the appellant had made several requests to the encroachers for removal of the encroachment and ultimately, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Aurangabad, by his order dated 25th of June, 1993, appointed the appellant as Duty Magistrate for use of police force, to remove encroachment in question. When the present appeal had been listed before us, a judgment of this Court in the case of Birendra K. Singh v. State of Bihar reported in [JT 2000 (8) SC 248], had been placed before us and it was contended that the question of applicability of the provisions of S.197 Cr. P.C. can be raised at the stage of framing of charge and, therefore, the impugned order of the High Court does not require any interference by this Court. The aforesaid decision, no doubt, supports the contention of the learned Counsel, appearing for the respondent to a great extent but as we doubted the correctness of the aforesaid enunciation of l