The main legal point established in the judgment is that claimants are entitled to the benefit of no-fault liability under S.140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, irrespective of whether the accident occurred due to the victim's negligence or not.

K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.

This is an appeal preferred by the Insurance Company challenging an interim award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Thrissur, in O.P. (M.V.) No. 675 of 1995, under S.140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, awarding compensation.

2. When the appeal came up for admission before a Division Bench of this Court, it doubted the correctness of the interpretation given to S.140 of the Motor Vehicles Act by another Division Bench of this Court in Thomas v. Mathew, 1995 (2) KLT 260, and referred this matter to a Full Bench, and hence this appeal before us.

3. In the instant case, the motor accident occured on 31.5.1994, due to the collision of a tempo van and a lorry. Lorry was insured with the appellant. Driver of the tempo van died in the accident. Legal representatives of the deceased preferred a claim petition under S.140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, hereinafter referred to as the 'Act', and the Tribunal passed an interim award dated 8.11.1996, awarding an amount of Rs. 25,000/- each to the claimants.

4. Counsel for the Insurance Company, Sri. Jacob Murikan, submitted that since the driver of the tempo van was negligent, Tribunal committed an error in awarding the interim compensation to his legal representatives under S.140 of the Act. According to counsel, where death or permanent disablement has resulted from an accident occurred due to collision of two vehicles, what is envisaged in S.140 of the Act is to meet the liability of third parties, and not to meet the liability of the owners themselves, or their legal representatives. In support of his contention, counsel relied on the above mentioned decision of this Court in Thomas's case.

5. Counsel for the claimants, Sri. V. Chitambaresh, on the other hand, submitted that in the case of 'no fault liability', there is no scope for enquiry as to who is at fault, and the question as to who is negligent in the accident is to be decided in the final proceedings under S.168 of the Act, and not at the stage of determining a claim under S.140 of the Act. In support of his contention, counsel relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Leela, 1996 A.C.J. 1246.

6. The Division Bench in Thomas's case, to which one of us, Radhakrishnan, J., was a party, was dealing with a case of 'no fault liability' under S.140 of the Act. In that case, Tribunal found that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the claimant. Consequently, the claim petition was dismissed in toto. On appeal before this Court, claimant raised an alternative contention under 'no fault liability'. Division Bench examined the said contention and held that if the accident was admittedly due to the negligence of the claimant alone, who was driving the motor cycle, and the car owner was totally innocent of the occurrence, then to allow the faulter to collect large amount of his loss from the non-faulting party was seemingly inconsistent with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. Bench felt that joint and several liability was understood in law as an equal liability which did not telescope into each other, and that the said liability was by and large to third parties, and not against each other.

7. Another Division Bench of this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd's case, to which one of us, K.K. Usha, J., was a party, took a contrary view. Bench held that by a mere reading of the Section, it can be seen that an enquiry into the question as to who was responsible for the accident or on whose negligence the accident happened is not contemplated at all, while a claim under S.140 of the Act is being considered by the Tribunal. Bench also disagreed with the view taken by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in K. Nandakumar v. Managing Director, Thanthai Periyar Transport Corporation Ltd., 1992 ACJ 1095.

8. In view of the conflicting views expressed by two Division Benches of this Court, it has become necessary to examine in de