The main legal point established in the judgment is that a decree for injunction obtained by the decree holder against the original judgment debtors could be enforced against the assignees of the judgment debtor as provided in O.21 R.32 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Balasubramanyan, J.

The decree holder challenges the order of the Executing Court refusing to execute the decree for injunction obtained by him against judgment debtors 1 and 2, against their assignees, impleaded as judgment debtors 3 to 5. The decree restrained judgment-debtors 1 and 2 from blasting rock from the B Schedule property described in the decree. Judgment debtors 3 and 4 are assignees of the decree B schedule property. They violated the decree for injunction and the decree holder sought to proceed against them under O. XXI R.32 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The transferees resisted execution by contending that though they are assignees of the property covered by the decree, they cannot be proceeded against in execution under O. XXI R.32 of the Code of Civil Procedure, since a decree for injunction is personal and affects only the original judgment debtor and S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act has no application since there is no decree against any property and an injunction does not run with the land. Their objection was upheld by the Executing Court and relief refused against the additional judgment debtors. This refusal is questioned by the decree holder.

2. Though generally a decree for prohibitory injunction restrains a person from doing something and in that sense it could be said to be personal, it cannot always be considered to operate merely against a person. In a case where the decree restrains a judgment debtor from doing something in his own land to the detriment of the decree holder or in derogation of a right claimed by the judgment debtor to enjoy his own property as an owner, the decree could not be understood as merely personal and not binding on the representative or assignee of the judgment debtor in relation to the property in respect of which it is obtained. In this case the decree is one restraining the owner of the B Schedule property from blasting rocks in that property on a finding that such blasting would injuriously affect the adjacent owner of the A schedule property, the decree holder. When once a decree is passed, it is obvious that the defendant in the suit, judgment debtor would be precluded from carrying on blasting operations in his property. To say that when he succeed by others, they would not be bound by the restraint relating to the enjoyment of the particular property is to derogate from the principle of public policy that there shall be no second litigation in respect of the same right and the same property. To uphold a contention that the assignee from the judgment debtor can with impunity go about blasting rocks from the decree B schedule property against the terms of the decree would, in my view, jettisan the very concept of finality of litigations, the concept of the merger of the cause of action in the decree and the principle of lis pendence, all principles of public policy. It cannot be the policy of law that every time an assignment of the decree schedule property takes place, the decree holder should institute a fresh suit against the assignee so as to prevent him from disobeying the decree obtained by the decree holder against the original owner of the property. In any event, unless compelled, the court should not accede to such a contention and I see nothing which compels the court to come to the conclusion that the decree for injunction in the present case cannot be enforced against the assignees of the B schedule property. Call it the principle of impendence or call it by any other name, the policy of our law is that normally an assignee or a legal representative is bound by the decree obtained against the assignor or the predecessor-in-interest. This is the policy underlying our procedure and it is recognised by S.146, 0.21 R.16 and the Explanation to that Rule, S.11 and S.50 of the Code of Civil Procedure and S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The view of the executing court that the principle of S.52 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot apply