The termination of services of Government Pleaders must be based on valid reasons and should not be arbitrary, in compliance with Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Jagannadha Rao, CJ.

The question arising in these two Writ Petitions relates to the stage at which, in a similar case in Shrilekha Vidyarthi v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1991 SC 537), the matter was left open for fresh consideration by the Government on the question of termination and appointment of Government Pleaders on individual basis. (2)

2. The following are the facts: OP 10391 of 1991 is filed by M.A. Mohammed Ashraf, Advocate-Government Pleader while OP 10826 of 1991 is filed by Thariyan Joseph, Advocate-Government Pleader. Petitioner in O.P. 10391 of 1991 was appointed as a Government Pleader in the High Court of Kerala under an order ofthe Government dated 26-3-1991 for a period of three years from the date of assumption of charge. On 1-10-1991 he was served with a notice dated 30-9-1991 issued by the Secretary to the Government, Law Department which after referring to the Kerala Government Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of service) and Conduct of Cases Rules, 1978 (hereinafter called 'the rules') and in particular to Rule 17 relating to termination, states that the services of the petitioner as Government Pleader have been considered by the Government to be no more necessary for them and that the said service should be terminated immediately. The notice further states that the petitioner is given one month's time in the sense that the appointment shall stand terminated on the expiry of one month from the date of receipt of Ext.P2 notice. Questioning the said notice, petitioner filed the present Writ Petition. In O.P. 10826 of 1991, the petitioner Mr. Thariyan Joseph was appointed as Government Pleader in the High Court of Kerala on 26-3-1991 for a period of three years from the date he would assume charge. The petitioner therein assumed charge on 3-4-1991. He too received a notice dated 30-9-1991 which after reciting the provisions of the Rules referred to above and Rule 17, proceeded to state that service of the petitioner therein was considered by the Government to be no more necessary for them and that it would stand terminated on the expiry of one month from the date of receipt of the said notice. Petitioner therein, therfore, questioned the above said notice.

3. When the first of the Writ petitions came up for consideration before the learned single judge, the same was referred to a Division Bench. Thereafter, the second Writ Petition, referred to above, was directed to be posted alongwith the first Writ Petition. That is how both the Writ Petitions have come up before us.

4. Sri.K. Balakrishnan, Advocate appeared for the petitioner in O.P. 10391 of 1991. The submissions were adopted by the counsel in O.P. 10826 of 1991. Sri Cyriac Joseph, learned Additional Advocate General appeared for the Government. The Government filed counter in the first matter which was treated, by consent of the counsel, as counter in both the cases. At the stage when the stay petitions were taken up, counsel on both sides requested us to dispose of the two Writ Petitions on merits.

5. Though in the Writ petitions the vires of Rule 17 was questioned and it was also stated that the impugned notice was issued by an authority inferior to the appointing authority, the said contentions were not pressed. The main thrust of the argument of learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. K.Balakrishnan, was that the proposed termination of the service of the two petitioners as Government Pleaders under the respective individual notices was an arbitrary exercise of power under Rule 17 of the Rules and that it was not a fair and reasonable exercise of power and that it was the result of a change in the government which came into office in June 1991, after the recent elections. It was also contended that there was no material for the respondents to show either that the services of the petitioners were no longer considered necessary or, as stated in the counter affidavit, that the government did not have confidence in the petitioners.