1990 Supreme(Ker) 349
Judges : MANOHARAN
Lakshmana Pillai - Appellant
Versus
Krishnaswamy - Respondent
Case No : AS.No. 4 of 1984
Decided On : 10/23/1990
Advocates Appeared :
P.K. Balasubramanyan For Appellant P. Sukumaran Nayar & A.K. Chinnan For Respondents
The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation of the right of pre-emption under Ext.A1, the enforceability of the right against a sale executed in execution of a decree for specific performance, and the subsistence of the right of pre-emption at the time of sale, at the date of the suit, and at the passing of the decree.
Headnote:
RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION - ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHT OF PRE-EMPTION - KERALA PRE-EMPTION ACT - Clause 10 of Ext.A1 - AIR 1954 SC 417, AIR 1958 SC 838, AIR 1959 Lahore 72, AIR 1965 Punj. 346, AIR 1951 Cal. 551, A.I.R 1956 Allah bad 1, AIR 1932 P.C. 57, AIR 1962 Kerala 122 - The court discussed the relevant clauses in Ext.A1 and interpreted the intention of the parties to find that the first respondent also had the right of pre-emption under Ext.A-1. The court also considered the nature of the right of pre-emption, its characteristics, and the enforceability of the right in the context of a sale executed in execution of a decree for specific performance. The court held that the right of pre-emption could be enforced against such a sale. The court further analyzed the subsistence of the right of pre-emption at the time of sale, at the date of the suit, and at the passing of the decree, and concluded that the right of pre-emption ceased to exist pending suit, and therefore, the right could not be enforced. The appeal was allowed, and the decree and judgment of the lower court were set aside.
Fact of the Case:
The suit was for enforcement of a right of pre-emption. The first defendant entered into an agreement with the appellant to sell the property, and the first respondent alleged that he was entitled to have the property offered to him. The appellant contended that the suit was premature and that the right of pre-emption could not be enforced as the sale was executed in execution of a decree for specific performance.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the first respondent also had the right of pre-emption under Ext.A-1. The court held that the right of pre-emption could be enforced against a sale executed in execution of a decree for specific performance. However, the court concluded that the right of pre-emption ceased to exist pending suit, and therefore, the right could not be enforced.
Issues: The issues involved the interpretation of clause 10 of Ext.A1, the enforceability of the right of pre-emption against a sale executed in execution of a decree for specific performance, and the subsistence of the right of pre-emption at the time of sale, at the date of the suit, and at the passing of the decree.
Ratio Decidendi: The court interpreted the relevant clauses in Ext.A1 to determine the intention of the parties and held that the first respondent also had the right of pre-emption under Ext.A-1. The court also analyzed the nature of the right of pre-emption, its characteristics, and the enforceability of the right in the context of a sale executed in execution of a decree for specific performance. The court further concluded that the right of pre-emption ceased to exist pending suit, and therefore, the right could not be enforced.
Final Decision: The appeal was allowed, and the decree and judgment of the lower court were set aside.
Second defendant is the appellant. The suit was for enforcement of a right of pre-emption.
2. The facts can be summarised as follows:-
First defendant's mother Chempakam Ammal executed Ext.A-1 settlement deed settling properties inclusive of the plaint schedule on her five sons and a grandson. The plaint schedule is D schedule in Ext.A-1 allotted to the 4th party in the settlement deed. The first defendant, Gopala Pillai, the 4th party and Chempakam Ammal executed Ext.A-2 mutual exchange deed under which the D schedule wi 'S obtained by the 1st defendant who is the 3rd party in Ext.A-1. The plaintiff was allotted C schedule therein. Chempakam Ammal reserved right of enjoyment on all the items in Ext. Al except C schedule. According to' the first respondent as per clause to in Ext.A1, alienation of property allotted under Ext.A-1 could be only to the allottees therein. First defendant entered into an agreement with the appellant to sell the property pursuant to which he instituted Ext. A4 suit for specific performance and the suit was decreed. The first respondent alleged that he is entitled to have the plaint schedule property offered to him and that the first defendant was not entitled to execute sale deed in favour of the appellant who is a stranger. First defendant died pending suit.
3. The appellant contended that, the first defendant did not have any right of pre-emption under clause 10 of Ext.A1. If at all there is one, the suit is premature. The sale in favour of the first respondent is not a voluntary sale and therefore even if the first respondent has any right of pre-emption that cannot be enforced. It was also contended that at any rate on the death of the first defendant even if there was right of pre-emption in favour of the first respondent that ceased to exist.
As already stated Chempakam Ammal reserved right of enjoyment over all items except the C schedule. C schedule was allotted absolutely to the first respondent. It is claimed that the right of pre-emption is contained in clause 10 of Ext.A1. The case of the appellant is clause 10 does not confer any right of pre-emption on the C schedule's owner, the first respondent. It is now necessary to see the relevant clauses in Ext.A1. Clause 10 cannot be read in isolation. That clause is only part of the whole scheme of allotment. The clauses have to be read and understood assigning the natural meaning to the words used therein. The intention of the parties has to be found out from a reading of the clauses and if the clauses do not suffer from any ambiguity the construction would be easier. Clause 10 states that after the death of the executant the respective allottees of all item except C schedule (-could be in the With the children of the respective sharers. The contention of the appellant is, right of pre-emption is conferred only on allottees except C schedule owner. In clause 8 of Ext.A-1 the executant reserves right of enjoyment till her life on all items except C schedule. Clause 9 states that after her death the owners of A, B,D, Hand F schedules could be in possession and enjoyment of the property. It proceeds to state that the respective owners except C schedule can effect mutation.
5. The first part of Clause 10 contains a direction as to what should follow on the death of the executant. In that context the clause stales that, the respective allottees except C schedule could be in possession and enjoyment on the death of the executant. It was unnecessary to make such a provision for C schedule as C schedule was given absolutely. In the succeeding part of the said clause the words used is "any of the shares" in contradistinction to "shares except C schedule's owner" used in the first part and mandates that if alienation is made, it should be to the sharers in the document. This is. Followed by further statement as to the termination of the right of pre-emption where it.
The respective sharers. The language used in the clauses advanced early is clea