The main legal point established in the judgment is that the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 restricts the application of the general law under the Code for maintenance payable to Muslim wives.

An order of the Court of Session, Trivandrum enhancing maintenance awarded to a divorced Muslim wife and her daughter, after the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (hereinafter called 'the Act') came into force is impugned in these proceedings.

2. Maintenance was awarded to the wife and daughter earlier. By M.C. 59/87 they sought enhancement and the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Trivandrum declined the prayer. Additional Sessions Judge, revised the order of the Magistrate and enhanced the amount. The enhancement in favour of the daughter is not challenged, and rightly too.

3. The question for consideration is, whether a Muslim wife is entitled to invoke Section 127 of the Code after 19-5-86, the date on which the 'Act' came into force. Learned Sessions Judge felt that she could. In his view, the Act supplemented the rights enuring to a divorced Muslim wife under section 125 to 128. The reasons for this conclusion, is that there was no repeal of Sections 125 to 128, express or implied. According to him in the absence of repeal, the Act supplemented widened or enriched the contents of rights enuring to the wife under the Code. The Sessions Judge thought that such was the intention of Parliament. Decisions of this court in Ali v. Sufaira, (1988) 2 Ker LT 94 and Aliyar v. Pathu, (1988) 2 Ker LT 446 were also referred to, to support this view. The decisions have no bearing on the question arising in this case. In Ali v. Sufaira the learned Judge was dealing with the sweep of the expression 'provision' occurring in Section 3(1)(a). In Aliyar v. Pathu the Division Bench, considered the scope of Section 3(1) & (2) of the Act and the liability of a former husband to make provision for the wife, beyond iddat period. Whether an action under section 127 survives the Act, was not considered in the decisions cited, and they are of no help in resolving the controversy raised.

4. Sessions Judge is right in his view that Sections 125 to 128 of the Code do not stand repealed. This is for, reasons more than one. The Act contains no provision of repeal. Besides, Sections 125 to 128 are not confined in their operation, to Muslim wives alone. The sections apply to a host of others, such as divorced wives belonging to other religions, neglected parents and children without sufficient means. But, this is beside the point.

5. The answer to the question is available in Sections 5 & 7 of the Act. Besides, the well known rule of interpretation is that the special law excludes the general. In Queen v. London County Council (1893) 2 QB 454 Bowen L.J. observed :

"Now a general Act, prima facie, is that which applies to the whole community ...... as opposed to that, you get statutes which may well be public because of the importance of the subjects with which they deal and their general interest to the community, but which are limited in respect of areas which makes them local - or limited in respect of individuals or persons - a limitation which makes them personal."

In Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh, AIR 1964 SC 260 : (1964 (1) Cri LJ 152) referring to provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure the Supreme Court stated the law (Para 7) :

"A special law therefore means a law enacted for special cases, in special circumstances, in contra-distinction to general rule of law, laid down as applicable generally to all cases with which the general law deals".

6. Cases are legion to support this view. When a special law namely the 'Act' was enacted to govern maintenance payable to Muslim wives, application of the general law under the Code, is excluded or restricted.

7. Shri C. K. S. Panicker appearing for respondents submitted that the Act dealt with only the personal law and that it augmented the provision in sections 125 to 128. According to him the law relating to prevention of vagrancy in the Code remains in-tact. It is argued that the right under the Code is independent of the personal law and is unaffected. If one considers the