Judges : G.VISWANATHA IYER
SALEEM - Appellant
Versus
DEPUTY COLLECTOR - Respondent
Case No : O.P. No. 10934 of 1987-B
Decided On : 01/06/1988
Advocates Appeared :
P.H. Sankara Narayana Iyer; For Petitioner Central Govt. Standing Counsel; For Respondent
Art.226 - Recruitment of Sepoys in the Central Excise Department - S.28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 13 of 1985 - Art.323A(2)(d) - S.14 - The court discussed the applicability of the Administrative Tribunals Act to the recruitment of Sepoys in the Central Excise Department. It interpreted the scope of S.14 and the preamble of the Act to determine whether the Act applied to future appointments and concluded that the Act's jurisdiction extended to future direct recruitments as well.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus to be appointed as a Sepoy in the Central Excise Department after being unsuccessful in the selection process.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the Original Petition under Art.226 was not maintainable as the jurisdiction of the court was excluded by S.28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 13 of 1985 read with Art.323A(2)(d) of the Constitution of India.
Issues: The main issue was the maintainability of the Original Petition under Art.226 in relation to the recruitment of Sepoys in the Central Excise Department.
Ratio Decidendi: The court's decision was based on the interpretation of the scope of S.14 and the preamble of the Administrative Tribunals Act, concluding that the Act's jurisdiction extended to future direct recruitments as well.
Final Decision: The Original Petition was dismissed, and there was no provision for transfer of the Original Petition to the Central Administrative Tribunal as prayed for by the petitioner.
1. I am of the opinion that this Original Petition under Art.226 of the Constitution is not maintainable. The question raited relates to recruitment of Sepoys in the Central Excise Department. The petitioner was an aspirant for selection. He underwent the physical test successfully. He was also interviewed. But he was not selected, according to him wrongfully and for extraneous reasons. Therefore he seeks the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to appoint him as a Sepoy.
2. Counsel for the respondents raised a preliminary objection that the jurisdiction of this court is excluded by S 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 13 of 1985 (the Act) read with Art.323A(2)(d) of the Constitution of India. He points out that the Original Petition relates to recruitment to the Civil service of the Union, which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal under S.14 of the Act, the relevant clause of which reads:
"(a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any All-India Service or to any civil service of the Union or a civil post under the Union or to a post connected with defence or in the defence services, being, in either case, a post filled by a civilian;"
3. Faced with this difficulty, counsel for the petitioner valiantly attempted to salvage the writ petition with the contention that the Act applied only to persons who were already is service on the date on which it came into force, and that it was not intended to apply to future appointments. In support, he relied on the preamble to the Act, which runs as under:
"An Act to provide for the adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any Stale or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of (any corporation or society owned or controlled by the Government in pursuance of Art.323-A of the Constitution) and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto."
Stress was laid on the words, "disputes and complaints with respect to the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts." The word used being 'appointed', the preamble conclusively establishes that the Act is intended to apply only to persons already in service. If the Act were intended to apply to future appointments as well, the language employed should have been "appointed or to be appointed".
4. It is one of the cardinal principles of construction that where the language of an Act is clear, the preamble must be disregarded, though, where the object or meaning of an enactment is not clear, the preamble may be resorted to to explain it. Again, where very general language is used in an enactment which, it is clear, must be intended to have a limited application, the preamble may be used to indicate to what particular instances the enactment is intended to apply. We cannot therefore, start with the preamble for construing the provisions of an Act, though we would b5 justified in resorting to it, may, we will be required to do so, if we find that the language used by Parliament is ambiguous or is too general, though in point of fact Parliament intended that it should have a limited application. (Burrakur Coal Co. v. Union of India A.I.r. 1961 S. C. 954) The preamble may be used to solve any ambiguity or to fix the meaning of words which may have more than one meaning, but it cannot be used to eliminate as redundant or unintended, the operative provisions of statute (State of Rajasthan v. Leela (A. I. R.1965 S. C. 1296). S.14 inter alia vests the Central Administrative Tribunal with exclusive jurisdiction over matters in relation to, or concerning recruitment to any All India Service or any civil service of the Union. "Recruitment" in the Section is not restricted
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