Judgement

BHAGWATI, C.J.I. (Concurring) :- I am in entire agreement with the judgment prepared by my learned Brother Ranganath Misra, but since the questions involved in these writ petitions are of seminal importance affecting as they do, the structure of the judicial system and the principle of independence of the Judiciary, I think I would be failing in my duty if I did not add a few words of my own.

2. There are two questions which arise for consideration in these writ petitions and they have been succinctly set out in the judgment of Ranganath Misra, J. The first question is whether the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution in service matters specified in S. 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the impugned Act) and the vesting of exclusive jurisdiction in such service matters in the Administrative Tribunal to be constituted under the impugned Act, subject to an exception in favour of the jurisdiction of this Court under Arts. 32 and 136, is unconstitutional and void and in any event, even if the first question be answered against the petitioners and in favour of the Government, the second question required to be considered is, whether the composition of the Administrative Tribunal and the mode of appointment of Chairman, Vice-Chairmen and members have the effect of introducing a constitutional infirmity invalidating the provisions of the impugned Act. I agree with the answers given to these questions in the judgment of Ranganath Misra, J. I would articulate my reasons as follows :-

It is now well-settled as a result of the decision of this Court in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCR 206: (AIR 1980 SC 1789) that judicial review is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution and no law passed by Parliament in exercise of its constituent power can abrogate it or take it away. If the power of judicial review is abrogated or taken away the Constitution will cease to be what it is. It is a fundamental principle of our constitutional scheme that every organ of the State, every authority under the Constitution, derives its power from the Constitution and has to act within the limits of such power. It is a limited Government which we have under the Constitution and both the executive and the legislature have to act within the limits of the power conferred upon them under the Constitution. Now a question may arise as to what are the powers of the Executive and whether the Executive has acted within the scope of its power. Such a question obviously cannot be left to the Executive to decide and for two very good reasons. First the decision of the question would depend upon the interpretation of the Constitution and the laws and this would preeminently be a matter fit to be decided by the judiciary, because it is the judiciary which alone would be possessed of expertise in this field and secondly, the constitutional and legal protection afforded to the citizen would become illusory, if it were left to the executive to determine the legality of its own action. So also if the legislature makes a law and a dispute arises whether in making the law, the legislature has acted outside the area of its legislative competence or the law is violative of the fundamental rights or of any other provisions of the Constitution, its resolution cannot, for the same reasons, be left to the determination of the legislature. The Constitution has, therefore created an independent machinery for resolving these disputes and this independent machinery is the judiciary which is vested with the power of judicial review to determine the legality of executive action and the validity of legislation passed by the legislature. The judiciary is constituted the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution and to it is assigned the delicate task of determining what is the extent and scope of the power conferred on each branch of Government, what are the limits on the