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1988 Supreme(Ker) 83

Judges : PAREED PILLAY
PAILAPPAN - Appellant
Versus
SEBASTIAN - Respondent
Case No : S.A. No. 462 of 1982
Decided On : 02/15/1988
Advocates Appeared :
V. Sankara Menon; S. Sreekumar; For Appellant T.P. Kelu Nambiar; For Respondent

A private person can maintain a suit for public nuisance if they can show special damages. Section 91 of the CPC does not limit the right of suit that may exist independently of the Section.

Headnote:

Section 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) was discussed in the judgment. The court clarified that a private person can maintain a suit for public nuisance if they can show special damages. Section 91(2) states that nothing in the Section shall limit or affect any right of suit that may exist independently of the Section.

Fact of the Case:

Plaintiff filed a suit for injunction against the defendants who denied his possession of the property and existence of a pathway. Trial Court upheld the existence of the pathway and granted injunction, but the lower appellate Court dismissed the suit. The plaintiff appealed to the higher court. The higher court found overwhelming evidence of the pathway and held that the plaintiff, even without exclusive title or possession, is entitled to an order of injunction to protect his right of way. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court were set aside and that of the trial Court were confirmed.

Finding of the Court:

The court analyzed the evidence, including documents and the commissioner's report, to establish the existence of the pathway. It discussed the rights of a person with access to a public pathway or road and the basic rights and amenities they are entitled to. The court cited precedents to support the presumption of special damage when obstruction occurs. It also interpreted Section 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) to clarify that a private person can maintain a suit for public nuisance if they can show special damages. The court concluded that the trial Court was justified in granting injunction to the plaintiff and the lower appellate Court erred in reversing the judgment and decree.

Ratio Decidendi: The plaintiff, even without exclusive title or possession, is entitled to an order of injunction to protect his right of way if obstruction occurs. A private person can maintain a suit for public nuisance if they can show special damages. Section 91 of the CPC does not limit the right of suit that may exist independently of the Section.

Result: The judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court are set aside and that of the trial Court are confirmed. Second Appeal is allowed with costs.

Judgment :-

1. Appellant is the plaintiff in O.S. 449 of 1973 of the Munsiff Court, Chavakkad. His suit for injunction though decreed by the trial Court was dismissed by the lower appellate Court.

2. Plaint A schedule property lies in between items 1 and 2 of B schedule. Plaintiff claims to be in exclusive possession of it. Plaintiff contends that A schedule property is the only way to his property from the main road and sought injunction against the defendants from obstructing his user of the property and taking income from it Defendants denied the plaintiff's possession over the plaint A schedule property. They also denied the existence of any pathway as alleged in the plaint. First defendant contended that A schedule property is in his actual possession and it is included in the documents in his favour. Second defendant also denied the existence of the pathway and further stated that be has not threatened to trespass upon the property in the possession of the plaintiff

3. The trial Court on a consideration of the entire evidence upheld the existence of the pathway leading to the plaintiff's property. In Ext. C-6 plan the pathway leading to the property of the plaintiff is demarcated. Plot BEHC in Ext. C-6 in the plaint A schedule property. Plot EFGH is admittedly the property in the possession of the first defendant. This is described as item No.1 in B schedule to the plaint. Plot ABCD is the property in the possession of Lonappan This is described as item No. 2 in the B schedule. Property belonging to the plaintiff lies on the western side. Several documents produced in the case sufficiently clearly proved the existence of A schedule pathway. Exts. A-4 to A-12 and A-14 unequivocally established the existence of the pathway in between the first defendant's property situated in R. S.91/4 and the property in the possession of Lonappan in R. S.91/5. The commissioner's report and plan lend considerable support to the plaintiff's case regarding the pathway (A. schedule property) from Guruvayur-Enamavu road to his property. In view of the above overwhelming evidence denial of the pathway is only an exercise in futility.

4. Counsel submitted that even if the plaintiff does not have any title to A schedule property the injunction grafted by the trial Court should not have been refused as A schedule property is his only way of access to his properly from Guruvayur-Eaamavu road. Plaintiff's contention that he is entitled to exclusive right over that pathway is not tenable. Nevertheless, in view of the evidence that A schedule property is the only way for plaintiff to reach his property the question to be considered is whether injunction can be granted as he apprehends trespass and interference by the defendants. It is in evidence that for the first time as per Ext. A-10 date 14-8-1973 an attempt was made to show that the property on the south of the property in the possession of the first defendant is not a pathway. In all other documents the southern property of the 1st defendant's property is described as a pathway. Hence plaintiff's apprehension of annexation of A schedule property by the first defendant cannot be stated to be baseless.

5. A person having access to his compound from a public pathway or road is entitled to certain basic rights and amenities. He has certainly the right of ingress and egress through the road or pathway. No person can meddle with that right or is any manner diminish it by any sort of interference. The right of way through a public pathway or road is not dependent upon any prescriptive right or long user. It stems from the very existence of the read abutting or leading to one's property. The owner of a property having read access can definitely seek the intervention of the court for redressal of his grievance whenever he apprehends obstruction or nuisance or any sort of interference to his just and peaceful user of the road. If any such highhanded action occurs special damage to the owner of the property c









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