The main legal point established in the judgment is that alternate remedy under S.69 of the Act is not an absolute bar for interference under Art.226 of the Constitution of India, especially in cases of patent rejection or acceptance of nomination papers.

Jagannadha Rao, CJ. This appeal is preferred against the judgment of the learned Single Judge in O.P.No.7361 of 1992 dated 9-6-1992. The Writ Petition was dismissed in limine, and against the said order the present appeal is preferred.

2. The appellant-writ petitioner was a member of the Co-operative Bank, and was a candidate in the election to the Board of Directors to be held on 28-6-1992. His nomination was rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground that the name of the Bank had not been written by hand, but a seal had been affixed. The said order of the Returning Officer was challenged in the Writ Petition, and a direction by a writ of mandamus was sought to the Returning Officer (first respondent) to accept the nomination papers and permit the writ petitioner to contest the election. The learned Single Judge dismissed the Writ Petition on the ground that the petitioner had an alternate remedy by way of raising a dispute before the Registrar under S.69 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act.

3. We have heard learned counsel on both sides, and the learned Government Pleader. The question that falls for consideration before us is whether the alternate remedy under S.69 of the Act in the case of rejection of nomination papers by the Returning Officer is an absolute bar for entertaining the Writ Petition under Art.226 of the Constitution of India and evm in cases where the rejection of the nomination is patently illegal and when there is no need for any evidence or further enquiry, this Court should drive the affected parties to proceedings under S.69 of the Act it is contended by counsel that there is conflict of decision given by this Court and that therefore the matter should be reviewed. With a view to resolving the said conflict, we are now considering the relevant case law.

4. In Damodaran v. Joint Registrar, 1989 (1) KLT 856, Viswanatha Iyer, J. was dealing with a case of rejection of nomination. The-learned Judge referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Muthuswamy v. Natarajan AIR 1988 SC 616, which held that there should ordinarily be no interference at the intermediate stage of an election process under Art.226 of the Constitution. The learned judge further observed that on the facts of the case before him the rejection of the nominations was so revolting to common sense and judicial conscience and that therefore this Court is not precluded from interfering under Art.226 of the Constitution of India. In that case, the nomination had to be supported by an affidavit of the candidate testifying that he was not disqualified under R.44. This affidavit had to be attested either by a Gazetted Officer or by an advocate. The affidavits contained the attestation of the advocate, but did not contain the seal. The same was rejected by the Returning Officer on the ground that there was no seal of the, advocate. The learned Single Judge noticed that the fact that the affidavit was attested by an advocate was not in dispute, and observed that the nomination papers should not have been rejected on the ground that the advocate had not affixed his seal. Attestation by an advocate was complete as soon as he affixed his signature as a mark of his attestation. The law did not impose a further stipulation that he should put his seal. On that ground the learned judge interfered in wri't jurisdiction. Similarly, in Velunni v. Returning Officer, 1990(2) KLT 816, K.A. Nayar, J. interfered in writ jurisdiction in the case of an invalid acceptance of a nomination. The learned judge held that on facts it was a clear case where the nomination ought to have been rejected as invalid, inasmuch as the particular candidate was a member of the committees of two other Co-operative Societies of a different type or types, and by virtue of the prohibition contained in R.35(3)(d)(iii) he would be disqualified to contest for the election. In that context, the learned judge observed that alternate remedy was not a bar to exercise the j