The main legal point established in the judgment is the application of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, particularly Art.137, and the invocation of S.5 of the Limitation Act in arbitration proceedings.

1. The respondent Railway contractor entered into an agreement with the appellants herein for the construction of quarters at Olavakkode in Putuppariyaram Amsom. The work was to be completed on 14-9-1973. In spite of several extensions given to the respondent, he could not complete the work and ultimately the appellants rescinded the contract with effect from 31-12-1977. The respondent made several correspondence with the appellants Railway for cancellation of the rescission of the contract and also to permit him to complete the remaining work. This prayer was rejected by the General Manager and thereafter the respondent filed a suit under S.20 of the Arbitration Act for appointment of an Arbitrator. The suit was resisted by the appellants on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation. The court below rejected that contention and held that the petition under S.20 of the Act is within time. The appellants challenge the finding.

2. The short question that arises for consideration is whether the respondent's suit under S.20 of the Arbitration Act is barred by time. The provisions of the Limitation Act are made applicable to Arbitration proceedings by virtue of S.37 (1) of the Arbitration Act. S.37(1) of the Arbitration Act reads:

"All the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply to Arbitration"

However, no specific period of limitation has been prescribed for the filing of the petition under S.20 of the Arbitration Act. Art.137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is the relevant provision applicable to these proceedings. In Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum v. T. P. Kunhaliumma ((1976) 4 SCC. 634) the Supreme Court considered the scope of amplitude of Art.137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Court considered whether this provision would apply to a petition filed under S.16 (3) of the Indian Telegraphs Act for enhancement of compensation. The Supreme Court considered the distinction between Art.137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and Art.181 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The Court held:

"S. 2(b) of the Act defines "application" to include a petition. This changed definition in the 1963 Act indicates the object of the Act to include petitions, original or otherwise, under special laws.

Article 137 includes petitions within the words "applications". The alteration of the division as well as the change in the collocation of words in Art.137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 compared with Art.181 of the 1908 Limitation Act shows that applications contemplated under Art.137 are not applications confined to the Code of Civil Procedure. In the 1908 Limitation Act there was no division between applications in specified cases and other applications as in the 1963 Limitation Act. The words "any other application" under Art.137 cannot be said on the principle of ejusdem generis to be applications under the Civil Procedure Code other than those mentioned in Part I of the third division (Article 137 occurs in Part II). Any other application under Art.137 would be petition or any application under any Act. But it has to be an application to a court for the reason that S.4 and 5 of the 1963 Limitation Act speak of courts.

Hence the conclusion is that Art.137 of the 1963 Limitation Act will apply to any petition or application filed under any Act to a civil court.

Now where by statutes matters are referred for determination by a court of record with no further provision the necessary implication is that the court will determine the matters as a court."

3. in the instant case the appellant Railway terminated the contract with effect from 31-12-1977 by letter dated 1-7-1978. The appellants contended that an arbitration suit filed after a period of three years from 1-7-1978 is barred by limitation. To rebut this contention the respondent contractor stated that on 21-6-1978 the respondent requested the appellants to consider his claim for enhancement of rate and also to cancel the rescission of contract. This was rejected by the Ra