The statutory scheme of disciplinary proceedings for imposing major punishment excluded the ordinary jurisdiction of the Manager to convert a finding of not guilty by the enquiry officer into a finding of guilt.

1. Does the Kerala Education Act curtail the ordinary recognised right of the disciplinary authority, the Manager, to accept or reject the findings of the enquiry officer? This, in turn, raises the question of interpretation and application of R.75 in Chap.14-A of the Kerala Education Rules (KER for short). This question not specifically posed and considered in any decided or reported cases, even according to the counsel for both parties, arises for determination in this writ appeal and the Original Petition under Art.226 of the Constitution. The facts, in brief, are these:

2. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated as early as 1973 by the Manager of an Aided Educational Institution, against two members of the non-teaching staff, a Clerk, Shri George Thomas and a Menial staff, Shri T. Cherian. Both of them were suspended pending enquiry. The continuance of the suspension became illegal for want of necessary sanction of the educational authorities. The Manager, therefore, adopted the dubious procedure of reinstating them and suspending them afresh. However, they had to be reinstated, but not until they obtained orders from the higher authorities in the Education Departments, the Government and eventually directions from this Court in writ jurisdiction. The conduct of the Manager in refusing to comply with the orders of reinstatement was, strongly condemned by this Court in earlier writ proceedings when he was described as "recalcitrant". Justice Khalid, as His Lordship then was, observed thus:

"This writ petition makes a sad reading, in as much as the Government have not shown, a recalcitrant Manager, his proper place, in spite of the fact that he attempted to disobey the orders of the superior officers on more than one occasion".

3. The Manager, naturally, was disqualified as per the KER and the challenge against that order before this Court was also unsuccessful. By the time, his wife, who was the Headmistress of the institution, retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation and was eligible for the Managership of the School. She thus became the Manager. The disciplinary proceedings against the two delinquent non-teaching staff had to be continued The following charge had been framed against Shri George Thomas, the Clerk:

"Shri George Thomas while working as a Clerk in T.M.V.M H S., Vettiyar conspired with Shri T. Cherian Full-time menial of the school and removed the voucher file containing payment of special

fees for the year 1971-72."

Against the Menial Staff Shri T. Cherian, the charge framed read thus:

"T. Cherian while working as full-time menial in T.M.V.M.H.S, Vettiyar conspired with Shri George Thomas and removed the school records (Vr. file) for the year 1971-72".

4. The District Educational Officer. Mavelikkara, was appointed as the enquiry officer. He was the only officer competent to conduct the enquiry as per the KER. He conducted the enquiry The parties, the delinquents and Manager, co-operated in the enquiry. On the side of the management, nine persons were examined, including the former Manager, the husband of the present Manager. The witnesses were allowed to be cross-examined. The District Educational Officer found, after a close and careful consideration of the evidence, that the charges against both of them were not proved and that they can be exonerated.

5. After the receipt of the enquiry report, the Manager disagreed with the findings of the enquiry officer and issued a memo to the two persons stating that it was proposed to impose 'the extreme punishment of dismissal, and calling for their explanation. These memo's are challenged in the writ petitions. The writ petition filed by Shri T, Cherian, Full-time Menial. O.P. No. 1509 of 1983, was dismissed by a learned single judge holding that the writ petition was premature, it was unnecessary to express any view on the merits and that "whatever be the merits of the petitioner's contentions, in regard to facts and law, this Court should