The judgment established that the rules of natural justice should be considered in the context of statutory provisions, and if a statutory provision excludes the application of any rules of natural justice, the court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authority.

1. These writ appeals are by two parents of two students who were dismissed by the Headmaster of the High School where they were studying. On 17th February 1969, a violent commotion took place before the school, during the course of which the Headmaster and some of the teachers of the school were attempted to be manhandled. The students, in their attempt to manhandle the teachers, abused them in vulgar language and also brutally beat one of the students. The Headmaster intimated the parents of seven students, who were considered to be the ring-leaders of the trouble; and on a subsequent day, he dismissed them too. Appeals were taken before the District Educational Officer, before whom it was contended that the Headmaster did not follow the principles of natural justice in not framing formal charges against them and in not holding an enquiry too in other words, in dismissing them without hearing them. The District Educational Officer himself held an enquiry and found that the charges levelled against the students were established. The result was that he confirmed the dismissal orders.

2. Writ petitions were filed before this Court; and a learned judge dismissed the writ petitions holding that, though the Headmaster did not frame formal charges against the students and did not also give them an opportunity to explain the charges, the defect was cured when the District Educational Officer held an enquiry and evidence was also taken, in appeal before him. In the result, the Single Judge held that there was no defect in the dismissal orders.

3. In appeal the same argument that was raised before the Single Judge has been reiterated. In reply the Government Pleader has drawn our attention to R.6 of Chapter IX of the Kerala Education Rules. Clause (1) of the rale lays down that any pupil, who is deliberately insubordinate or mischievous or guilty of fraud or malpractice in connection with examinations or who is found guilty of any other offence under these rules or who by his proved conduct is in the opinion of the Headmaster likely to cause an unwholesome influence on other pupils, may be, according to the degree of the offence, censured, suspended or dismissed by the Headmaster. And one of the Notes to this clause says that before a pupil is suspended or dismissed, the Headmaster shall inform the pupil's guardian about it. And this rule, according to the Government Pleader justified the action of the Headmaster.

4. The counsel of the appellants, at this stage, has drawn out attention to the decision of Mathew J. in President, Commonwealth Co-operative Society, Ltd v. Joint Registrar (General) of co-operative Societies (1969 KLT. 580), where the learned judge has considered the application of the principles of natural justice,.. The learned judge has observed that, even if a statute does not expressly provide for notice, the justice of the common law will supply the omission and will require notice and will also require an opportunity to be given to the affected party of being heard. In this connection, Mathew J. has considered a few English decisions and the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhagwan v. Ram Chand(AIR.1965 SC. 1767). The Government Pleader has, in his turn, drawn our attention to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. J. N. Sinha (AIR. 1971 SC. 40). The Supreme Court has laid down in this decision that the rules of natural justice are not embodied Rules, nor can they be elevated to the position of fundamental rights; that their aim is to secure justice or to prevent miscarriage of justice; that these rules can operate 'only in areas not covered by any law validly made; that they do not supplant the law but only supplement it; that if a statutory provision can be read consistently with the principles of natural justice, the courts should do so, because it must be presumed that the legislatures and statutory authorities intend to act in accordance with the principles of natural justice, bu