The capacity of the karanavan to represent the tarwad in property dealings and the effect of possessory mortgage on the equity of redemption, including the concept of adverse possession.

1. In Mathew v. Ayyappankutty 1962 KLT. 61 a full bench of this Court held that the sale of tarwad property by the karanavan of the tarwad to a mortgagee in possession alters the character of the latter's possession so as to include within its scope the interest of the mortgagor tarwad with the result that, notwithstanding that the sale was an invalid sale not binding on the tarwad, a suit for redemption would be barred after twelve years of such altered possession. That is precisely the case here. It was in 1926 that the karanavan of the tarwad to which the property in suit belonged sold the property to the 1st defendant mortgagee who was in possession. The sale was invalid for want of the written consent of all the other adult members of the tarwad as required by S.21 of the Travancore-Ezhava Act by which the tarwad was governed and which had come into force a few months before the sale only the senior anandaravan had given his written consent by subscribing to the sale deed and there were admittedly two other adult members of the tarwad at the time. It was only in 1951, twenty five years later, that the plaintiff brought his suit for redemption on the strength of a purchase a few months earlier from the then surviving members of the tarwad. It is not disputed that if Mathew v. Ayyappankutty 1962 KLT. 61 was rightly decided, the learned single judge who heard the second appeal from which this appeal has been preferred was right in setting aside the decree for redemption passed by the lower appellate court and restoring the decree of the trial court dismissing the suit. But the division bench which heard this appeal in the first instance thought that the decision in Mathew v. Ayyappankutty 1962 KLT. 61 required reconsideration in the light of the decision in Padma Vithora v. Mohd. Multani AIR. 1963 S.C. 70and has, in that view, referred the case to a full bench. That is how the case has come up before us.

2. With great respect we think that Mathew v. Ayyappankutty 1962 KLT. 61 was rightly decided and we are able to see nothing in Padma Vithora v. Mohd. Multani AIR. 1963 S.C. 70 (which has been distinguished by the learned single judge) that calls for a reconsideration thereof.

3. When an interest is carved out of property, as, for example, by the grant of a mortgage or a lease or other restricted interest therein, two distinct and separate interests come into being, each by itself a distinct subject of property which can be the subject matter of independent possession. (See Khiarajmat v. Daim ILR. 32 Calcutta 296 at pp. 311 and 312.) True, in the case of a possessory mortgage, the mortgagee is in possession of the tangible property. But that means no more than that he is in possession of the mortgage interest; the mortgagor owner continues in possession of what remains after the transfer effected by the mortgage, namely, what is usually and conveniently called the equity of redemption, just as the landlord continues in possession of the reversion notwithstanding that the tenant is in possession of the tangible property. That is way a person who obtains possession of tangible property under an invalid lease or mortgage prescribes only for a tenant's or mortgagee's title as the case may be. He is regarded as in possession of only that interest in the property to which his animus is directed the owner is regarded as in possession of the rest, namely, the reversion, or the equity of redemption; and that again is why, generally speaking, a trespasser on tangible property is regarded as in possession of only that interest therein that the person entitled to present possession thereof has a person trespassing on property in the hands of the owner of a restricted interest therein entitling him to present possession thereof, is regarded as in possession only of that restricted interest and not of the whole. He prescribes only for the restricted interest and not for full ownership. At the same time, it is settled law Padma Vi