The main legal point established in the judgment is the inapplicability of the writ of certiorari to quash orders passed by a Civil Court.

1. This appeal is from an order of Justice Mathew dismissing O. P. No. 1636 of 1965. The prayer in the writ application is that "this court may be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ or

order calling for the records and quash the impugned order Ext. P-8 dated 4-4-1965 passed by the 1st respondent Administrator."

2. The first respondent to the O. P. is the Administrator of the Union Territory of Laccadives, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands. He has powers by virtue of S.28 of the Laccadive Islands and Minicoy Regulations, 1912, to execute decrees passed by the Civil Court as envisaged by S.24 of the Act. It was pursuant to this power that the impugned order Ext. P-8 was passed by him. The O. P. was dismissed by the learned judge as he felt bound by the view which be considered has been expressed by the Supreme Court in a recent decision in Naresh v. State of Maharaslra reported in AIR. 1967 SC. 1.

3. The particular passage from the judgment relied on by the learned judge runs thus:

"Whilst we are dealing with this aspect of the matter, we may incidentally refer to the relevant observations made by Halsbury on this point. 'In the case of judgments of inferior Courts of civil jurisdiction', says Halsbury in the footnote,

"it has been suggested that certiorari might be granted to quash them for want of jurisdiction [Kemp v. Balne.(1844), I Dow. & L. 885, at p. 887] inasmuch as an error did not lie upon that ground. But there appears to be no reported casein which the judgment of an inferior Court of civil jurisdiction has been quashed on certiorari, either for want of jurisdiction or on any other ground'.

The ultimate proposition is set out in the terms: 'Certiorari does not lie to quash the judgments of inferior Courts of civil jurisdiction'. These observations would indicate that in England the judicial orders passed by civil Courts of plenary jurisdiction in or in relation to matters brought before them are not held to be amenable to the jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari."

It is contended before us that those observations are not binding on us. Counsel for the appellant has taken us in detail through the judgment in Naresh v. State of Maharashtra reported in 1967 SC. I to make out that those observations are merely casual observations and cannot be taken to be the expressions of opinion of the Supreme Court even by way of obiter dictum. He also pointed out that the passage quoted from Halsbury's Laws of England and relied on by the Supreme Court has been stated in Halsbury's Laws of England Supplement 1965 to be incorrect. This passage, it is urged, had not been brought to the notice of the Supreme Court.

4. We shall deal with these aspects. Reading the judgment in its entirety we find it difficult to accept the contention that the observations made by the Supreme Court are merely casual observations which can be ignored by this Court. It forms part of the reasoning in the judgment and there seems to be an expression of opinion which we consider binding on us.

5. No doubt it is true that in Halsbury's Laws of Engl and, Supplement 1965 it is stated in Para.23; note (g) with reference to the passage relied on by the Supreme Court that "this is incorrect". Two decisions (R. . Judge Hurst, Ex parte Smith, (1960) 2 Q. B. 133), R. v. Judge Worthington-Evans, Exparte Madan, (1959) 2 Q. B. 145) have also been cited as authorities for the proposition that a writ will issue to a Civil Court. In R. v. Judge Hurst, Ex parte Smith, (1960) 2 Q. B. 133 the Queen's Bench issued a writ of certiorari to quash an order of the county court and in R. v. Judge Worthington-Evans, Ex parte Madan (1959) 2 Q. B. 145 the Court observed:

"We are satisfied that in a proper case this Court has power by certiorari to bring up and quash the order of a county court judge made without jurisdiction."

6. Our attention has also been invited to a recent decision in Reg. v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, Ex parte Lain (1967) 3