The main legal point established is the revisability of orders under the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, the interpretation of the commencement period of the Act, and the applicability of S.22 to post-commencement sales.

1. The questions arising for determination in this Civil Revision Petition are three:

(a) Whether an order passed by the appellate authority functioning under the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, 1958, is revisable by this Court? (b) Whether the period of one year provided by the fourth proviso to clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of S.22 should commence from the date of publication of the amending Act, (Act II of 1961) 3011961?

(c) Whether an application under S.22 of the same Act, in relation to a sale that took place after the commencement of the Act would lie?

2. The revision petitioner moved the Munsiff's Court, Wadakkancherry on 6 41961 to set aside an execution sale which was held on 15 31961 for arrears of rent due from the Revision Petitioner. This application was rejected and availing himself of the provision in S.23A of the Kerala Agriculturists Debt Relief Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) an appeal was filed before the Additional Subordinate Judge, Trichur. It is from the order dismissing that appeal that this revision is moved.

3. A preliminary objection was taken by the counter petitioner that in view of the provision in S.23 A of the Act that the order passed in appeal shall be final this Court is precluded from dealing with the revision petition. We shall read S.23A:

(I) or sub-section (3j of S.9 and Ss 12, 18, 22 and 23 to the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the decisions of the court passing the order and the order passed in appeal shall be final:

Provided that where the order is passed by a Revenue Court the appeal shall lie to the District Court within whose jurisdiction the Revenue Court is situate and such appeal shall be filed within sixty days of the date of the order appealed against."

4. One view that can be taken is that the finality given to the appellate order by the section means only that there shall be no further appeal. However, it is contended by the respondent that the finality given by the section precludes even a revision petition. S.23A of the Act must be reconciled with S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is not suggested that the appellate authority under the Act which is a "civil court" acted in any capacity other than that of a 'civil court." The order that is impugned before us is therefore an order passed by a civil court which is normally amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.

5. The identical question has been considered by the Madras High Court in a Full Bench decision reported in K. Parthasaradhi Naidu Garu v. C. Koteswara Rao Garu and another (AIR. 1924 Mad. 561) and Chief Justice Schwabe stated that it is an accepted legislative practice to use words similar to those employed in S.23 A when the legislative intent is to preclude further appeals. This however, the learned judge said, would not debar the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. The relevant passage is at page 562 and reads thus:

"It is the ordinary mode of expression used for the purpose in much of the legislation in England on which this legislation is founded; and, where the whole object of revision is to prevent a Court, from which there is no appeal, acting contrary to its jurisdiction, a finding that it is the law that, because the words used are "the decision shall be final," a Court ordinarily subject to the revisional powers of this Court, should be permitted to act wholly without jurisdiction without the aggrieved party being entitled to any remedy, would in my judgment be untenable, and that would be the effect of deciding this second point in favour of the contention put forward."

6. To the same effect is the decision of the Pull Bench of the Allahabad High Court reported in Shah Chaturbhuj v. Shah Mauji Ram (AIR. 1938 All. 456).

7. Apart from the above decisions there is the weighty observation of the Supreme Court in the decision in Nemi Chand and another v. The Edward Mitts Co. Ltd. and another (AIR. 1953 SC. 28), at page 32:

"Perhaps it may be pos