The main legal point established in the judgment is that specific provisions in the Schedule of a fiscal statute prevail over general provisions in the body of the Act, and the interpretation of the term 'subject-matter' in relation to court-fee computation is crucial.

1. This is a reference made by the Taxing Officer of this court as to the sufficiency of court-fee of Rs. 25/-paid on a writ appeal preferred under S.5 of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958 (Act V of 1959).

2. S.21 in Chapter IV of the Kerala Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, X of 1960, (hereinafter called the Act) prescribes:

"Fee how reckoned. - The fee payable under this Act shall be determined or computed in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter, Chapter VI, Chapter IX and Schedules I and II." And Schedule II of the Act, in its Art.3 (iii) (A) (2) provides:

According to the Taxing Officer, the court-fee payable on this appeal is Rs. 100 as per (c) in the above provision.

Counsel for the appellant relies on S.52, the last section in Chapter IV of the Act, which reads:

Appeals:- The fee payable in an appeal shall be the same as the fee that would be payable in the Court of first instance on the subject-matter of the appeal:

' .......................................................................................................................................................

and contends that the fee payable on a writ petition being Rs. 25/- under Art.11 (r) of Schedule II of the Act, the Art.3(iii)(A)(2)(c), requiring a fee of Rs. 100 for a writ appeal, is inconsistent with S.52 and that in cases of such inconsistency the Schedule must yield to the section in the body of the Act.

The learned Advocate-General urges that S.52 is a general provision for all appeals, whether in suits, in original petitions, or in interlocutory applications, while Art.3(iii)(A)(2) relates to a particular category of appeals, viz., appeals under S.5 of the Kerala High Court Act, and that the rule of construction is always that a particular provision prevails over a general one within the limits of the former.

Shri. K.P. Ramunni Menon, as amicus curiae, pointed out that S.52 by its own expression applies only to cases where the court-fee depends on, and therefore varies with, the subject-matter of the appeal and that a writ appeal not being of that category is outside the purview of the Section to be governed by Art.3(iii)(A)(2) only.

3. Usually, the Schedule in a statute is an appendage prescribing forms or rules for the working of the enactment. But Schedules in fiscal statutes prescribing the rates of taxation are of a different type. They are as much an important part of the Act as any other part thereof and whether the provisions as to rates are to be in the body of the Act or in a Schedule is a matter of mere drafting convenience and not a bifurcation according to the purpose, relevance or importance of the contents. It is very often convenient to draft a table of rates as a Schedule, and a provision directing payment of fee or tax in accordance with it as a section. The Schedule must then be held and read as part of the Section, and not as a mere appendix thereto. In such cases the rule of construction is as laid down by Lord Sterndale M. R. in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Gittus (1920 I K.B. 563 at 576, affirmed by a unanimous Hose of Lords in 1921, 2 A.C. 81, though the instant rule has not been discussed by the noble Lords.)

"It seems to me there are two principles of rules of interpretation which ought to be applied to the combination of Act and Schedule. If the Act says that the Schedule is to be used for a certain purpose and the heading of the part of the Schedule in question shows that it is prima facie at any rate devoted to that purpose, then you must read the Act & the Schedule as though the Schedule were operative for the purpose, & if you can satisfy the language of the section without extending it beyond that purpose you ought to do it. But if in spite of that you find in the language of the Schedule words and terms that go clearly outside that purpose, then you must give effect to them and you must not consider them as limited by the heading of that part of the Schedule or by the purpose mentioned in the Act for w