The main legal point established in the judgment is that an administrative order, such as a suspension order, can be deemed necessary in the public interest and the interest of the institution based on the gravity of the charges and the authority's decision to order an inquiry.

1. This case, if it has served little else, but served to expose a disquieting state of affairs regarding the disposal of valuable forest lands . belonging to a religious institution known as the Sree Pulpally Devaswom of which I trust due notice will be taken by the competent authority in the interests of the public administration and the preservation of our forest wealth no less than in the interests of this particular institution.

2. The Devaswom is in the Kozhikode District where the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 (for short, the Act) is in force. It is governed by a scheme settled under the [since repealed] Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926 which must, by reason of S.103 of the Act, be deemed to be a scheme settled under the Act. The scheme requires the Hindu Religious Endowments Board (now replaced by the Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments) to appoint a paid manager for the day to day management of the Devaswom, & in making the appointment, the Board is to have due regard to the claims and qualifications of the members of the family in which the hereditary trusteeship of the Devaswom is vested. Accordingly, the Board appointed the petitioner, a member of that family, as manager in November 1946, and the petitioner continued as manager until, by Ext. D dated 318 1962, the 1st respondent Commissioner suspended him from office and appointed the 4th respondent, the executive officer of another Devaswom, to function as manager until a suitable person was chosen from among the members of the trustee family. In between, in January 1955, the hereditary trustee, the 3rd respondent (the karanavan of the trustee family) had been suspended under S.45 of the Act and the petitioner appointed as "fit person" to discharge the functions of the trustee in his stead under sub-section (3) of that section. The petitioner held the office of fit person in addition to the office of manager until, in January 1962 the 3rd respondent was restored to the office of trustee as a result of his suspension being quashed by the High Court.

3. The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari or mandamus or any other appropriate writ or order quashing the order of suspension and restraining the 1st respondent Commissioner and his subordinates from giving effect to that order. The grounds on which he seeks this are: (1) That the order was without jurisdiction; and (2) That it was actuated by mala fides.

4. The first ground is based on the circumstances that while the scheme (Ext. A) makes provision for the dismissal of the manager by the Board (now the Commissioner) it does not expressly provide for the suspension of the manager pending enquiry into charges against him. Therefore, it is argued on the strength of Hotel Imperial v. Hotel Workers' Union (AIR. 1959 Supreme Court 1342 para 10), the 1st respondent Commissioner had no jurisdiction to suspend the petitioner.

5. This argument forgets that by rules made under S.100 (2) of the Act and issued in G. O. MS. No. 182, Rural Welfare, 5th February, 1953-page 50 of the Madras Rules and Notifications, 1953 in the 1953 supplement to the Madras Law Journal express provision is made for sudh suspension. R.1 of these rules says that the expression, "Executive Officer" includes any paid officer appointed under a scheme settled or deemed to be settled under the Act, by whatever designation called, provided that he is the highest executive authority in charge of the administration of the religious institution; and it is not disputed that the petitioner, although designated manager, satisfies this definition. R.15 empowers the appointing authority in the present case the Commissioner to impose penalties ranging from censure to dismissal upon Executive Officers and the last sentence of the first paragraph of R.16 which prescribes the procedure to be followed says, "an executive officer may be placed under suspension pending enquiry into grave charges where