The central legal point established is that payment made under coercion entitles the party to a refund, and an acknowledgment of liability can save a suit from the bar of limitation.

1. The suit out of which this appeal has arisen is for recovery of a sum of Rs. 350914-8 paid under protest by the plaintiff-Company as customs-duty for export of battens at the Land Entrance Chowkey, Quilon, during the period, July to November, 1946. According to the plaintiff, neither before July 1946, nor after November 1946, was any customs-duty realised from it for export of battens which it had been regularly doing for years since 1943, as the duty was leviable only in respect of planks or logs not being manufactured goods like battens. Notice under S.80 of the Civil Procedure Code having been served claiming, in vain, refund of the amount, the plaintiff has instituted the suit to compel refund of the same. The defendant-State by its written statement put the plaintiff to prove "that the several consignments in respect of which duty was paid by them under protest and refund is now claimed were exempt from duty," and also that the suit was barred by limitation. The District Judge found the plaintiff entitled to have the refund, but dismissed the suit without costs as barred by limitation. Hence the appeal by the plaintiff and cross-objection by the State.

2. It was clearly averred in the plaint that the duty of which refund is claimed related to "non-dutiable battens exported by plaintiff". There was no specific denial of this averment in the State's written statement. The only answer was that the plaintiff should prove that the duty collected from it related to non-dutiable goods. The specification of the goods in respect of which the duty was levied as battens was not disputed in the written statement. As the averments in the plaint not specifically denied in the written statement have, under R.5 of 0.8 CPC., to be taken as admitted, it must now be assumed that the duty collected was in respect of battens.

Exts. M and N are two letters by the State addressed to the plaintiff. They clearly show that battens are to be treated as manufactured goods, and non-dutiable as such. Ext. N dated March 16,1944, reads:

"In continuation of this office letter ROC No. 22/44/Devpt., dated the 9th March 1944, necessary orders have been issued for manufactured goods such as packing cases in shooks, staves of cases, etc., being excluded from the purview of the notification ROC. No. 9565/43/ Devpt., dated the 26th December 1943 regarding imposition of duty."

And Ext. M dated November 3,1946 runs thus:

"Government have already ordered that the notification regarding levy of export duty on planks, logs, etc., does not apply to manufactured goods, and that articles like packing cases in shooks which have only to be re-assembled after export will be treated as manufactured goods. Planks which have been worked into shape and size for packing cases and which are exported in that form to be re-assembled into cases after export will accordingly be treated as manufactured goods and not as mere planks. The necessary instructions have been issued to the Excise Commissioner."

Battens exported by the plaintiff are strips of wood to be nailed at the edges of cases made by the assembly of shooks, also exported by it alongside the battens to its customers, and it is conceded that shooks exported by plaintiff have never been charged with excise duty. As battens are pieces of planks 'worked into shape and size' to be assembled into packing cases, with ready made shooks exported to consignees in detached form to save wagon space they have to be treated as manufactured goods as shooks admittedly are. That has been the view of the Government too, before July and after November 1946. The finding of the court below that the collection of excise duty by the State on battens exported by plaintiff in the period July to November 1946 was not lawful appears to be correct.

3. Under Art.72 of the Contract Act, 'a person to whom money has ' been paid by mistake or under coercion must repay or return it.' The evidence on record clearly shows that the plaintiff was un