The main legal point established in the judgment is that the expiry of the term of appointment of the RTA members rendered the permit granted by the RTA invalid. The judgment also clarified the principles of de facto authority, collateral attack on the order, and the competency to raise jurisdictional questions in certiorari proceedings.

1. This is a petition under Art.226 of the Constitution by M/s Callicut Wynad Motor Service [Private] Ltd. The complaint is against the grant by the 2nd respondent, The Regional Transport Authority, Kozhikode, under Ext. P.1 order dated 13-11-1953, of a stage carriage permit for a proposed Ghat route between Ambalavayal-Kozhikode to one of their rival applicants, viz, the 3rd respondent Rajalekshmi Motor Service. The State is also impleaded as the 1st respondent. The main ground of challenge raised in the petition and seriously pressed before me is that on 13-11-1958 when Ext. P1. order was passed there was no constituted Regional Transport Authority for the Kozhikode District, for by that date the period of one year which the Government Notification of 23rd August 1957 had fixed as the term of appointment of the five members constituting the Authority, had expired. There was also a ground taken that an extraneous consideration had been imported by the Authority in their preference of the 3rd respondent, viz, he enjoyed more public confidence than the others but this has no importance in view to the predominant consideration as to "largest experience in Ghat routes" relied on by the Authority in support of the grant to the 3rd respondent.

2. The respondents 1 and 2 on the one hand and the 3rd respondent on the other have opposed the petition on basis of various pleas. [i] That the mere fact that the term of the members of the RTA had expired at date of Ext. P1. order was by itself no defect, [ii] that assuming there was a defect, it was cured by Ext. RI subsequent Government notification dated 23-12-1958, whereby the Government ordered the continuance of the RTA here among others, as on 1-8-1958 "from the date of the expiry of their term till their successors are appointed." [iii] that the RTA having functioned "defacto" in passing the order concerned, that order was beyond challenge in these proceedings which, according to the Respondents, were merely collateral, [iv] that the petitioner having been himself a rival applicant for permit before the RTA was precluded from raising the defect as a ground of relief under Art.226 and [v] that the petitioner had filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority raising the identical contention as here and the appeal was still pending. I will consider these, pleas in their order.

3. The first question is whether the expiry at date of Ext. P1 order of the period of appointment of the members of the RTA is no defect, This argument for the respondents in this connection is that there were two separate notifications issued on 23-8-1957, one constituting the RTA under S.44 of the Act without limit of time and the other appointing the 5 members and fixing their term of one year. This twin form according to the respondents, avoided the arising of an impasse as contended for by the petitioner. But this argument is without substance. For S.44 contemplates only a composite Notification constituting the Authority as embodied by its personnel. It is also difficult to understand what use an Authority can serve without anybody capable of functioning in its name being available. The question really is one of legal authority in the quandom members to represent the Authority at the time they purported to do. If they had become functus officio because their period of appointment had expired, they were representing none but themselves when they passed Ext. PI. order.

4. The next aspect is how far the subsequent Government Notification is helpful to the respondents. It is not claimed for the respondents in this connection that the Government passed the Notification in the exercise of any legislative power delegated to them under the Act. The Notification is merely an executive order purporting to provide a period of appointment for the members retrospectively. The rule is well-settled that even in a case where the executive Government acts as a delegate of a legislative authority, it has no plenary