The legal relationship between the plaintiffs and the defendant was one of principal and agent. The suit was not barred by limitation as the agency terminated with the execution of the sale deed and the plaintiffs had three years from that date to file the suit under Art.89 or Art.90.

1. The only question for decision in this second appeal is whether the suit is barred by limitation or not. According to the plaint allegations, one Kumaran Nair had taken an assignment of a decree for redemption of certain mortgaged properties which were in the possession of the plaintiffs, the defendant and other persons, and as the plaintiffs desired to obtain from him a sale of the equity of redemption they entrusted a sum of Rs. 900/- to the defendant, who was an acquaintance of the said Kumaran Nair, for negotiating the sale. The defendant was to settle with Kumaran Nair the terms of the sale and pay to him as advance the amount entrusted, and at the time of the execution of the sale deed this advance was to be adjusted against the sale consideration payable by the plaintiffs and they were to pay only the balance sale consideration. Alleging that the defendant did not pay the amount to Kumaran Nair and obtain from him the sale for them in pursuance of the terms of the entrustment and they had therefore to take a sale deed after direct negotiations with Kumaran Nair and paying the full sale consideration, without getting any credit for the amount entrusted by them to the defendant for payment of the advance, the plaintiffs brought this suit on 7-8-1126 (21st March 1931 A.D.) for recovery of the said amount and interest thereon. They had taken the sale from Kumaran Nair on 3-9-1123 and the suit was brought on the basis that their cause of action arose on the said date and they were entitled to get interest also from 3-9-1123. The defendant denied the entrustment and contended further that the suit was barred by limitation. The plaintiffs' case was that the entrustment was made by means of two payments, one of Rs. 500/- on 5-3-1122 (22-10-1946 A.D.) and another of Rs. 400/- on 2-6-1123 (16-1-1948 A.D). The courts below concurrently found that the plaintiffs have not proved the second payment of Rs. 400/- and that the first payment of Rs. 500/- on 5-3-1122 is true. They also found that this amount of Rs. 500/- was entrusted to the defendant for paying the advance to Kumaran Nair and obtaining from him a sale deed for the plaintiffs as alleged by them. On the question of limitation, the findings were divergent. According to the defendant, the suit is governed by Art.62 of the Limitation Act, and the plaintiffs' cause of action arose on the date of the entrustment, namely, 5-3-1122. The first court repelled this contention and, holding that the plaintiffs' cause of action arose only on 3-9-1123, gave a decree to them for recovery of Rs. 500/- and interest thereon. The lower appellate court upheld the defendant's contention regarding limitation, and reversing the first court's decree, dismissed the suit without costs. Plaintiffs have therefore brought this second appeal.

2. The plaint allegations and the concurrent findings of the court below are to the effect that the amount of Rs. 500/- was paid by the plaintiffs to the defendant for a specific purpose, namely for negotiating and obtaining for them a sale from Kumaran Nair and for paying the advance to him. At the time of the entrustment nothing had been settled as regards the terms of the sale deed to be taken, and neither the plaintiffs nor the defendant was sure whether Kumaran Nair would agree at all to give a sale to the plaintiffs. The defendant was to negotiate with Kumaran Nair and if the latter was agreeable to give a

sale, settle the terms of the sale with him and pay the amount entrusted by the plaintiffs as advance to Kumaran Nair so as to take a firm agreement. Therefore, what has really happened in this case is that the plaintiffs constituted the defendant as their agent for negotiating with Kumaran Nair and obtaining a sale from him for them and pay to him the necessary money for carrying on, on their behalf, the work with which he was entrusted, that is to say, the amount was paid by the plaintiffs to the defendant for a specific purpose in connecti