JUDGMENT

Pathak, J. - By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner, Messrs Chitra Cinema, Varanasi, challenges the validity of an award dated April 10, 1969 made by the Labour Court (II) Kanpur.

2. The first contention of the petitioner is that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute referred to it. It is submitted that the Labour Court, under Section 4-A of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, has been conferred power to adjudicate upon industrial disputes relating to any matter specified in the First Schedule to the Act, and that as the dispute, referred to the Labour. Court for adjudication concerns the revision of the rate of wages that is not a matter which falls within the First Schedule, Wages, it is pointed out, is specified as item no. I in the Second Schedule, and therefore a dispute in respect oil wages falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of an Industrial Tribunal constituted under Section 4-B of the Act. The contention is without substance. Section 4-A provides that the State Government may constitute one or more Labour Courts for the adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter specified in the First Schedule and "for performing such other functions as may be assigned to them under this Act." The power to refer a dispute for adjudication is conferred on the State Government by Section 4-K. That section provides that a dispute relating to one of the matters contained in the First Schedule. may be referred for adjudication to a Labour Court and a dispute in respect of a matter covered either by the First Schedule or the Second Schedule may be referred for adjudication to an Industrial Tribunal. Then follows a proviso which appears to its to be material to this case. It declares that if the dispute relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule and is not likely to affect more than 100 workmen, the State Government may make the reference to a Labour Court. It is clear, therefore, that the State Government has been specifically empowered to refer a dispute in respect of a matter mentioned in the Second Schedule to a Labour Court provided the dispute is not likely to effect more than 100 workmen. As pointed out already, the entry "wages" is mentioned as item no. 1 in the Second Schedule. It is also clear that the dispute here is in respect of two workmen only. Plainly, therefore, the State Government was empowered under the proviso to Section 4-K to refer the dispute to a Labour Court. It cannot be disputed that when the State Government referred the dispute to the Labour Court for adjudication, the adjudication of that dispute was a function assigned to the Labour Court under the Act. It was a function assigned to the Labour Court under Section 4-K of the Act, and, therefore, falls squarely within the terms of Section 4-A. The petitioner points out that in the order of reference nothing has been said about Section 4-A. That, it seems to us, was hardly necessary. Section 4-A itself contemplates that the function to be assigned to the Labour Court must be under the Act, and when the function is assigned to the Labour Court under Section 4-K it is Section 4-K to which reference alone need be made. It is also not possible to accept the submission that the function contemplated under Section 4-A cannot be the function of adjudication. The function may be assigned under any provision of the Act and there is nothing in the language of Section 4-A to limit the meaning of the word ,'function" used therein. Moreover, when we expressly find that the proviso to Section 4-K provides for a reference by the State Government to a Labour Court in respect of matters falling outside the ordinary jurisdiction of the Labour Court, it is plain that while the proviso to Section 4-K empowers the State Government to make such a reference Section 4-A vests jurisdiction in the Labour Court to entertain such a reference and dispose it of. If the contention of the petitioner was a