The main legal point established in the judgment is that while the Government had jurisdiction to interfere in revision and the relevant clauses of the Rent Control Order were valid, the Government's order was quashed due to an error of law apparent on the face of the record.

1. This petition is for a writ of certiorari to quash an order passed by the 3rd Respondent-Government under Clause.16 of the Travancore-Cochin Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Order, 1950, (hereinafter referred to as the Rent Control Order), an Order made under S.13 of the Travancore-Cochin Public Safety Measures Act, V of 1950.

2. Before stating the facts it might be as well to consider a preliminary objection taken on behalf of the 1st Respondent to this petition, the Catholic Bank of India, Changanacherry. The order complained against was passed on 4.1.1956. The present petition was filed on 28.5.1956, and it is argued on the strength of the Full Bench decisions reported in Mahadeva Iyer v. State, 1954 KLT 427 and Swaraj Motors v. Municipal Council Alwaye,1954 KLT 443, that the petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of unreasonable delay. It was suggested in these decisions that a reasonable time to file a petition of this nature would be 3 months, the time allowed for a civil revision petition. This 3 months' period expired in the present case on 4.4.1956 when the Court was on vacation and the petition was actually filed on the reopening day. In the circumstances it cannot be said that there has been unreasonable delay, and the preliminary objection is therefore overruled.

3. The facts are these: The petitioner holds an otti over the property in question, a piece of land 14 cents in extent forming S. Nos. 1255-A and B and 1256 of the Vanchiyoor Pakuthy in Trivandrum City and the buildings bearing door Nos. 980-A to D and 981 standing thereon. In 1945 the 1st Respondent bank bought the mortgagor's right in this property and thereafter, on 14.7.1945 entered into a registered lease deed with the petitioner by which it took a lease of the property for three years on an annual rent of Rs. 732 payable in two half yearly instalments. On the 1st October 1950 the petitioner made an application under Clause.4 of the Rent Control Order for fixing a fair rent for the property, and the Controller fixed the rent at Rs. 110/- per mensem by an order dated 27.6.1953. An appeal by it under Clause.15 of the Order having failed, the 1st Respondent bank filed a petition before Government under Clause.16, and by their order dated 4.1.1956 the Government allowed the petition and, setting aside the orders of the Controller and the appellate authority, dismissed the petitioner's application for fixation of fair rent. It is against this order of Government that the present petition is directed.

4. The first objection taken on behalf of the petitioner is that the Government had no jurisdiction to interfere in revision and that Clause.16 of the Rent Control Order which purports to confer the jurisdiction as also Clause.15 which provides for an appeal are invalid. I think that, for more reasons than one, this objection is not to be countenanced. In the first place it was not taken at the hearing of the revision petition by the Government; the petitioner submitted to their jurisdiction and took the chance of obtaining an order in his favour; and it follows from the decisions reported in G.M.T. Society v. Bombay State, AIR 1954 Born. 202 and John v. State, 1955 KLT 568, that the petitioner cannot be heard to raise the objection here.

5. That Clause.15 and 16 of the Rent Control Order are valid is concluded by authority - see the Division Bench ruling reported in Sippora v. Gopalan,1954 KLT 706 where it was held that S.15 and 22 of the Public Safety Measures Act read together enabled the Government to confer the right of appeal on any authority reserving a right of revision for themselves. Left to my own resources, uninformed by this decision, I might have been tempted to find that power not in S.15 and 22 but in S.13 under which the Rent Control Order is expressed to be made. For, it seems to me that the power to make an order providing for regulating the letting of accommodation necessarily implies the power to provide for the adju