Violation of mandatory consultation provisions with the Public Service Commission under S. 4 of the Public Service Commission Ordinance VI of 1124 renders the dismissal order invalid.

1. This is an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India praying:

1. that a writ of certiorari be issued to the counter petitioner for calling up the records and proceedings in Government Order ROC 5880/48/Home, dated 29.7.1949 and 13.8.1949 whereby the counter-petitioners have wrongly dismissed the petitioner from their service, for the purpose of scrutinising and quashing the same;

2. that a declaration may be made that the termination of the petitioner's service was improper, illegal inoperative, and void;

3. that a writ of mandamus or such other direction be made to the counter-petitioners for compelling them to reinstate the petitioner in Government Service in his former post or to provide him with a post of like status and remuneration and to reimburse the petitioner in full for the loss of salary occasioned by his wrongful dismissal from service; and

4. that such other further and incidental orders may be passed as would be required from time to time for a proper disposal of the case and to meet the ends of justice".

Along with the application the petitioner filed his affidavit and produced the documents exhibited therein marked A to G. The application was presented on 17.7.1952. The only respondent is the State of Travancore Cochin. On behalf of the respondent a counter affidavit sworn to by G. Bhaskaran Nair, under-Secretary in charge of the Home Section, dated 16th November, 1952, was filed in court the next day. One of the main complaints of the petitioner related to the want of consultation with the Public Service Commission in connection with the impugned order of dismissal under the Public Service Commission Ordinance, VI of 1124. The answer to this is contained in paragraph 7 of the counter-affidavit which reads as follows:

"The order of dismissal was passed when the Public Service Commission Ordinance, VI of 1124 was in force, R.16 of the Rules of Business framed under S. 5 of the Administration and Application of Laws Ordinance, 1124, which was in force at the time of the dismissal deals with cases to be submitted to His Highness the Raj Pramukh. The case of the petitioner does not come within this rule."

In the 12th paragraph of the counter-affidavit it is stated:

"The long delay in invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court must, it is submitted, induce this court to deny relief to the petitioner".

At the hearing of the application on 12.12.1952 an order was passed by one of us sitting alone quashing the impugned order of dismissal and disallowing the prayer for reinstatement. That order was passed upon certain concessions upon a point of law which the order refers to as having been made by the learned Advocate-General who appeared on behalf of the State. The State preferred an appeal against that order (A.S. No. 242 of 1953) and the Division Bench consisting of His Lordship the Chief Justice and one of us, reserved the order on the basis of an affidavit filed by the Advocate General denying the aforesaid concessions. The case was remanded for disposal on the merits by judgment rendered on 27.10.1953. The ground that the application was submitted after long delay which was taken in paragraph 12 of the counter-affidavit was not for obvious reasons pressed at the trial. That ground is not seen taken in the memorandum of appeal and it was not pressed at the argument of the appeal. When the matter came before the single judge after remand the learned Government Pleader pressed for the dismissal of the petition on account of its belated character alone. Relying upon a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in ILR 1953 TC 962 (1953 KLT 703) it was contended that a belated application should necessarily be dismissed and that a single judge in view of the decision of the Division Bench has no jurisdiction but to dismiss it. That question having been raised the case was referred to a Full Bench by order dated 6th January 1954 because another case in which the identical questi