The central legal point established in the judgment is that the language and terms of a mortgage deed are crucial in determining the intention of the parties regarding the surrender of a lease. The court emphasized the importance of analyzing the document as a whole to ascertain the parties' intentions.

1. Defendants 1 to 3 are the appellants. The suit is for redemption of a mortgage, Ext.A, dated 26.12.1080 and a puravaippa, Ext. E, dated 30.8.1090. The plaint property belonged to Kadangassery Mana. The Mana executed the mortgage and puravaippa in favour of one Manickan Raman, the predecessor-in¬interest of the defendants. The mortgage and puravaippa comprised two items of properties. Of these, item No.1 was outstanding on a lease granted by the mana to Raman's father, Manickan. Ext. I dated 30.5.1054 is the lease deed. Item No. 2 was outstanding on a lease granted by the mana to one Makkotha. In 1081 Makkotha attorned to Raman in respect of Item No. 2. Subsequently, Raman assigned the mortgage and puravaippa rights in favour of Makkotha as regards item No. 2 receiving proportionate mortgage and puravaippa amounts. The mana assigned the equity of redemption over both the items in favour of the plaintiff under Ext. B dated 31.1.1120. Makkotha surrendered his rights under the mortgage and puravaippa in respect of item No. 2 in favour of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff got possession of that item. The suit was instituted by the plaintiff for redeeming item No.1 on payment of proportionate mortgage and puravaipa amounts.

2. Defendants 1 to 3 contested the suit. Their main contention was that the plaintiff was not entitled to get khas possession of the property on redemption of the mortgage and puravaipa. According to them, the lease (Ext. I) was not extinguished with the execution of the mortgage (Ext. A) and what was mortgaged by the Mana was only the lessor's right in the property, the lease being kept intact. It was, therefore, contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to get khas possession of the property on redemption of the mortgage and puravaipa.

3. The trial court upheld this contention and held that the plaintiff was not entitled to get actual possession of the property on redemption of the mortgage and puravaipa. In appeal filed by the plaintiff from this decree the District Court also took the same view. But in second appeal our learned brother, Subramonia Iyer, J., took a different view. He held that with the execution of the mortgage the lease came to an end and that therefore the plaintiff was entitled to get khas possession of the property on redemption of the mortgage and puravaipa. The learned judge granted leave to defendants 1 to 3 to appeal from his decision.

4. The only question for decision in this appeal is whether the lease, Ext. I, came to an end with the execution of the mortgage, Ext. A. The question is whether the taking of the mortgage (Ext. A) by Raman who was holding the property on lease would amount to an implied surrender of the lease under S.111(f) of the Transfer of Property Act. According to the appellants, the effect of the mortgage was not to destroy the lease but only to suspend the obligation of the lessee to pay rent to the lessor while the mortgage subsisted.

5. Learned Counsel for the appellants relied on the decision of the Cochin High Court in Pappachan v. Ouseph (37 Cochin 524) in which Koshi, J., (as he then was) following the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Kallu v. Diwan (24 All. 487), observed as follows:

"If a landlord mortgages his interest to the tenant or the tenant mortgages his interest to the landlord, redemption of that mortgage would relegate the parties to the position they occupied before the mortgage came into being".

That was a case in which the lessee mortgaged his lease-hold interest in the property to the land-lord and took the property back on lease. The question whether the execution of the mortgage amounted to an implied surrender of the lease was not considered in that case.

6. The question whether the taking of a mortgage of the lease-hold property by the lessee will amount to a surrender of the lease is primarily one of intention of the parties. That was the view taken by the Cochin High Court in Markose v. Godar Nambudiripad (39 Cochin