Judges : GOVINDA PILLAI,T.K.JOSEPH
Kesava Iyer - Appellant
Versus
Maharaja Pillai - Respondent
Case No : A. S. No. 523 of 1951
Decided On : 08/04/1954
Advocates Appeared :
T. N. Subramonia Iyer; For Appellant T. K. Narayana Pillai; For Respondents
Promissory Note - Recovery of Amount - Travancore Limitation Act VI of 1100, Travancore Negotiable Instruments Act II of 1075 - Ext. B is a promissory note - Suit not barred by limitation
Fact of the Case:
The plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of the amount due under a promissory note executed by the 1st defendant. The suit was dismissed on the ground of limitation as the court held that the instrument was not a promissory note but a simple bond.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the instrument in question was indeed a promissory note and not a simple bond, and therefore the suit was not barred by limitation.
Issues: The main issue was whether the instrument in question qualified as a promissory note and whether the suit was barred by limitation.
Ratio Decidendi: The court analyzed the definition of a promissory note under the Travancore Limitation Act and the Travancore Negotiable Instruments Act, and referred to various legal provisions and case laws to determine the nature of the instrument.
Final Decision: The court allowed the appeal, set aside the decree, and remanded the suit to the Lower Court for fresh disposal, holding that the instrument was a promissory note and the suit was not barred by limitation.
1. This appeal arises out of a suit for recovery of the amount due under an instrument purporting to be a promissory note executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the 2nd defendant on 15.1.1122 and endorsed
by the latter to the plaintiff. Ext. B is the document in question. The 1st defendant admitted having executed Ext. B but he contended that it was not supported by consideration and that the suit was barred by limitation. After trial, the suit was dismissed on the ground of limitation. After trial, the suit was dismissed on the ground of limitation. Findings were not entered on the other issues as the learned Munsiff considered it unnecessary to do so, in view of his finding on the question of limitation. The plaintiff has preferred this appeal from the decree dismissing the suit.
2. The learned Munsiff held that Ext. B was not a promissory note but only a simple bond for which the period of limitation was only three years. He based his conclusion on the ground that an unconditional undertaking to pay a specified amount on demand was absent in Ext. B and that the latter portion of the instrument amounted to an indemnity clause which could not be brought within the definition of a promissory note. He also held that the plaintiff was estopped from contending that the instrument sued on was a promissory note as he had submitted to an order to pay additional stamp duty and penalty on Ext. B which was found to be an insufficiently stamped document at an earlier stage of the suit. The learned counsel for the 1st respondent rightly conceded that he did not support the decree on the ground of estoppel or that the instrument sued on was a bond.
3. The document on which the plaintiff founded his claim may be translated thus:
"Promissory note executed on the 15th day of Avani 1122 by Maharaja Pillai, son of Muthuperumal Pillai of Kesavan Puthoor, Azhakiapandipuram Pakuthy in favour of Sivan Pillai, son of Ramaswamy Pillai of Thuckalay Kizhakketheruvu. Thuckalay Pakuthy, Kalkulam Taluk. I have received from you a sum of Fs. 7500/- for payment of consideration under the sale deed of Thovala Sub Registrar's Office which I have taken this day, I promise to pay you or order the said sum of Rs. 7500/- with interest at 3/4 per cent per mensem and to get back the note. If I fail to pay as stated above, myself and my properties shall be liable for the principal, interest and all damages consequent on such default."
The contention of the 1st respondent before us was that the last sentence in the document amounted to an agreement and that the instrument ceased to be negotiable on account of that and that it could not therefore be deemed to be a promissory note. It may be mentioned here that the 1st defendant did not contend in his written statement that the document was not a promissory note. When he was examined in the case, he referred to the document as a promissory note even in his chief examination. It is admitted that the first part of Ext. B amounts to a promissory note. The controversy has thus become narrowed down to the question whether the last sentence in Ext. B which contains words to the effect that in case of default the 1st defendant and his properties would be liable for the consequent loss, takes it out of the definition of a promissory note. The argument was that this clause contained an agreement which made the instrument not negotiable and that the undertaking to pay the loss, made the amount payable under the instrument uncertain.
4. Under the Travancore Limitation Act VI of 1100 the period of limitation for a promissory note payable on demand was six years from the date of the note while the period for a suit on a simple bond was only three years. As this suit was instituted more than three years after the date of execution of Ext. B the suit would be barred by limitation if Ext. B is not a promissory note. The definition of a promissory note under the Travancore Limitation Act is as follows:- Promissory note mean
Reffered to AIR 1936 PC 171; AIR 1938 PC 121; AIR 1953 Cal. 758; AIR 1951 Ajmer 71;
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