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2008 Supreme(Ker) 337

Judgename : M.SASIDHARAN NAMBIAR
C.K.Muralimohan - Appellant
Versus
Asok Finance Corporation, Represented by Proprietor Asok Jain - Respondents
Case No : WP(C). No.4688 of 2008 (G)
Decided On : 07/07/2008

Advocates Appeared:For the Petitioner:Roy Chacko, Advocate. For the Respondents:R1, G. Gopakumar (Cherthala), Advocate.

Headnote:

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 2(e), Section 36 - Arbitration award - Petitioner was the surety to the second respondent who purchased an ambassador car under hire purchase agreement The hire purchase agreement contains an arbitration clause by which all disputes are to be settled by arbitration - Held, execution petition was originally filed before the District Judge, who even according to the petitioner is competent to execute the award. Learned District Judge in exercise of 'his powers under sub section (2) of S.4, made over the execution petition to Additional District Judge. By virtue of sub section (2) of Section 4 Additional District Judge has all the powers of the District Judge in discharge of the functions in respect of all matters including the execution petition assigned to him by the District Judge. Therefore as found by the executing Court, learned Additional District Judge is competent to execute the award. I do not find it necessary in this case to decide whether an Additional District Judge has the power to entertain an application under Section 34 of the Act in view of Section 2(e) of the Act. But as far as enforcement of the Award is concerned, so long as Section 36 does not provide that the award is to be enforced in the Court as defined under Section 2(e) and instead provides for enforcement of the Award in the same manner as if it were a decree, District Judge is competent to make over the execution petition to an Additional District Court. In that event, Additional District Judge having vested all the powers of the District Judge in discharging the functions, is competent to execute the award. Therefore neither the execution proceedings nor the sale can be challenged on the ground of want of inherent jurisdiction - Petition dismissed.

Judgment :-

E.P. 25 of 2004 was instituted before District Court, Alappuzha for execution of Ext.P2 arbitration award dated 212.1999 as provided under section 36 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Petitioner was the surety to the second respondent who purchased an ambassador car under hire purchase agreement. The hire purchase agreement contains an arbitration clause by which all disputes are to be settled by arbitration. So also the arbitration is to be at Chennai. A Retired District Judge, who was appointed the sole arbitrator, passed Ext.P2 award on 211.1995 in favour of first respondent decree holder for realization of Rs.3,31,529/- with interest @ 18% per annum till realization. For execution of the award, E.P.25 of 2004 was filed before District Court, Alappuzha and immovable property of the petitioner was sold on 112.2005. Later the sale was confirmed on 12.2006. When the decree holder/auction purchaser sought delivery of the property and delivery was ordered, petitioner filed E.A.55 of 2007 to set aside the sale and E.A. 56 of 2007 to review the order directing delivery of the property. The petitioners were originally dismissed by Additional District Judge, Alappuzha. It was challenged before this court in W.P.(C) 15527 of 2007. Under Ext.P7 judgment, that order was set aside and Additional District Judge after hearing both parties, as per common order dated 10.1.2008 dismissed the petitioners holding that Additional District Court, Alappuzha has jurisdiction to execute the award as provided under Section 36 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act and the property was validly sold in execution. This petition is filed under Article 226 and 227 of Constitution of India contending that Additional District judge, Alappuzha has no jurisdiction to execute the award and hence the entire execution proceedings including the sale is void.

2. Learned counsel appearing for petitioner and first respondent were heard.

3. The learned counsel, relying on definition of Section 2(e) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), argued that “Court” is defined under the sub-section as, means the Principal Court of original jurisdiction in a district and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original jurisdiction and therefore the court, as defined under Section 2(e), could only be the principal District Court and not the Additional District Court. Learned counsel also argued that under section 36 of the Act an award is to be executed before that court where an application to set aside the arbitral award as provided under Section 34 of the Act would lie and when Ext.P2, award was passed at Chennai, only the Principal Civil Court, which is the District Court at Chennai has jurisdiction to execute the award under Section 36 of the Act and even if property at Cherthala is to be sold in execution of the award it is to be transferred to District Court, Alappuzha after filing execution petition at Chennai and then only District Court, Alappuzha can execute the award. The learned counsel argued that the hire purchase agreement exclusively provides for arbitration at Chennai and therefore only District Court at Chennai has jurisdiction to execute the arbitration award and finding of the learned Additional District Judge is not sustainable. Relying of the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Sulekha Clay Mines V. Union of India (2000(1) KLT 691) it was argued that the Court, as defined under Section 2(e) of the Act is only the District Court and that District Court could only be the principal District Court and not an Additional District Court. Relying on the Full Bench decision of Bombay High Court in M/s. Fountain Head Developers Vs. Maria Arcangela Sequeira (AIR 2007 Bombay 149) it was argued that the court, as provided under subsection (e) of Section (2) is the District Court and it cannot even be the Additional District Court. Relying on the single Bench decision of the Hi

















































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