The question arising for consideration in this revision is whether minors in whose favour decree for maintenance was passed would be entitled to execute the decree within twelve years of the respective period for which maintenance is due or whether they should file the execution petition before the expiry of three years of their attaining majority as provided in Section 8 of the Limitation Act.

2. The petitioners herein are the decree holders. The suit was filed for maintenance. Decree was passed on 31-8-1989. It was a compromise decree. Rs. 75/- per month was allowed to both the petitioners as maintenance. The first petitioner, Sheela, attained majority on 22-12-1996. The second petitioner, Rajesh, attained majority on 18-61998. The execution petition was filed on 20-11-2002 for realisation of maintenance from 20-1-1988 to November 2002. Before the executing Court the respondent/judgment debtor contended that the execution petition is barred by limitation. It was also contended by him that Sheela was married and, therefore, she is not entitled for maintenance. The date of marriage is not mentioned by either party. The Court below accepted the contention raised by the judgment debtor and held that since the execution petition was t1led beyond three years of the attainment of majority by the minors. the execution petition is barred by limitation.

3. Section 6(1) of the Limitation Act provides that where a person entitled to institute a suit or make an application for the execution of a decree, is at the time from which the prescribed period is to be reckoned. A minor or insane, or an idiot, he may institute the suit or make the application within, the same period after the disability has ceased. as would otherwise have been allowed from the time specified then for on the third column of the Schedule. Section 8 of the Limitation Act is in the nature of an exception to 'Sections 6 and 7. Section 8 provides that nothing in Section 6 or in Section 7 applies to suits to enforce rights of preemption, or shall be deemed to extend, for more than three years from the cessation of the disability or the death of the person affected thereby, the period of limitation for any suit. or application.

4. The scope and ambit of Section 6 read with Section 8 came up for consideration in Indira Pillai v. Kesavan Channar (1968 KLT 673): (AIR 1969 Ker 163) (FB)). It was held by the Full Bench that what Section 6 of the Limitation Act has done is not to give a fresh starting point of limitation, but to extend the period of limitation prescribed in the First Schedule. Section 6 does not prevent the running of time as against a person under disability. Section 6 only means that the person under disability is entitled to an extension of time till the expiry of the period mentioned in the schedule calculated from the cessation of his disability (subject to the limitation mentioned in Section 8).

5. The question is whether in View of Section 8 of the Limitation Act, a minor, a person under disability, would be deprived of the entitlement- to make an application for execution within the same period which he would have been entitled to had he been not a person under disability. If the proposition as accepted by the Court below is accepted. a minor in whose favour a decree was passed would get only a period of three years to file the execution petition after attainment of majority. This, according to me, is not a correct proposition. If the minor is otherwise entitled to a larger period under the law of limitation than the period of three years as provided in Section 8 of the Act, the minor would not be deprived of that benefit which he would otherwise be entitled to. If it were not so, it could not be said that what is provided in Section 6 is a benefit to a person under disability; on the other hand. it would be a disability which is created by Section 6. Take for example. a decree is passed on 1-1-1990 in favour of a minor and on the same date a decree