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1961 Supreme(Ker) 1
KERALA HIGH COURT
ANNA CHANDY AND T. C. RAGHAVAN, JJ.
Sankarankutty Menon and others – Petitioners
v.
Deputy Superintendent of Police, Trichur and others - Respondents
Criminal Revn. Petn. No. 238 of 1957, Criminal Ref. No. 24 of 1958 and Criminal Revn. Petns. Nos. 223 and 239 of 1959
Decided On : 3 -1 -1961
M. Bhaskara Menon and C.Kunhirama Menon, for Petitioner (in Crl. R.P. 238/57);
T. Chandrasekara Menon and K.Achutha Menon, for Accused (in Crl. Ref. 24/58);
Panampilli Govinda Menon, P.K. Krishnankutty Menon and P.Narendra Menon, for Respondents (in Crl. R.P. 223 and 239/59);
C.M. Devan and K.P.G. Menon, for Petitioners (in Crl. R.P. 239/59);
Advocate General, for State.
The main legal point established in the judgment is the necessity of obtaining sanction for prosecution under S. 197 (1) Crl. P. C. and S. 132 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the reasonable connection between the act complained of and the duty of the officer as a public servant, and the requirement for previous sanction preceding the institution of the prosecution.
Headnote:
Sanction - Necessity for obtaining sanction of the State Government to prosecute under S. 132 or under S. 197 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure - S. 132, S. 197 (1) - Summary of Acts and Sections: S. 197 (1) Crl. P. C. lays down that when any public servant is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting in the discharge of his official duty, no court shall take cognisance of such offences except with the previous sanction of the State Government. Section 132, Criminal Procedure Code, provides that no prosecution against any person for any act purported to be done under Chapter IX of the Code shall be instituted in any Criminal Court except with the sanction of the State Government. The court discussed the necessity of obtaining sanction for prosecution under these sections and highlighted the key legal provisions and interpretations from authoritative pronouncements of the Privy Council, the Federal Court, and the Supreme Court. The court emphasized the reasonable connection between the act complained of and the duty of the officer as a public servant, the need for obtaining sanction at any stage of the prosecution, and the requirement for previous sanction preceding the institution of the prosecution.
Fact of the Case:
The cases involved charges against public servants for offences alleged to have been committed while acting in the discharge of their official duty. The accused in the first case was charged with criminal breach of trust and falsification of accounts, the accused in the second case was charged with releasing timber without depositing the balance price amount to the credit of the Government and falsifying the account of the Timber Depot, and the accused in the third case, police officers, were accused of beating and injuring individuals while on duty.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that sanction was necessary for prosecution under S. 197 (1) Crl. P. C. and S. 132 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in all the cases. It also held that obtaining a sanction subsequently would not validate the proceeding, as the sanction must precede the institution of the prosecution. The court quashed the charge in one case and the complaint in the other cases, and accepted the reference to quash the committal in another case.
Issues: The issues involved the necessity of obtaining sanction for prosecution under S. 197 (1) Crl. P. C. and S. 132 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the validity of obtaining a sanction subsequently.
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized the reasonable connection between the act complained of and the duty of the officer as a public servant, the need for obtaining sanction at any stage of the prosecution, and the requirement for previous sanction preceding the institution of the prosecution. It also highlighted that some offences by their very nature are incapable of being committed by public servants while acting in the discharge of their official duties.
Final Decision: The court quashed the charge in one case and the complaint in the other cases, and accepted the reference to quash the committal in another case.
RAGHAVAN, J. :
These cases raise an important and interesting question of law regarding the necessity for obtaining sanction of the State Government to prosecute either under S. 132 or under S. 197 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
2. The petitioner in Crl. R. P. No. 238 of 1957 was charged under Ss. 409 and 477-A of the Indian Penal Code.
He was the Head Accountant-cum-cashier in the Office of the Assistant Supply Officer, Ernakulam and he was entrusted with a sum of Rs. 1,525-8-6 on 16th February 1957, in his capacity as a public servant, for the purpose of disbursing that amount to one Padmanabha Prabhu, who supplied petrol to the Supply Department.
He committed criminal breach of trust with respect to the said amount by dishonestly misappropriating the same or converting it to his own use and also committed falsification of accounts of the above Department by making false entries in the said accounts. On these allegations charges under Ss. 409 and 477-A of the Penal Code were brought against him.
A preliminary objection was taken before the lower court that, as there was no previous sanction of the State Government, the complaint was liable to be dismissed. The learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate held that no sanction was necessary and the petitioner seeks to revise that order in this Criminal Revision Petition.
3. Crl. Ref. No. 24 of 1958 is by the Additional Sessions Judge of Parur under Ss. 215 and 439, Criminal Procedure Code, to have the committal order in Sessions Case No. 43 of 1957 (P.E. No. 2 of 1957 of the Court of the First Class Magistrate, Alwaye) quashed by this Court. In this case the accused, who was a Dy. Ranger in the Forest. Department, stood charged under Ss. 409 and 477-A of the Penal Code, for having released certain logs of timber without depositing the balance price amount to the credit of the Government and falsifying the account of the Timber Depot.
After preliminary enquiry the 1st Class Magistrate committed him to stand his trial under Ss. 409 and 466 of the Penal Code. The learned Sessions Judge after considering the case came to the conclusion that the committal should have been under Ss. 409 and 477-A instead of Ss. 409 and 466, I. P. C. But a preliminary objection having been taken before the learned Sessions Judge that there was no previous sanction of the State Government under S.197 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the learned Sessions Judge has referred the case to this Court for quashing the committal order.
It may be noted that in this case the sanction to prosecute was subsequently obtained and the same was placed before the learned Sessions Judge and therefore the further question, whether a sanction obtained subsequent to the commencement of the prosecution is sufficient also arises for decision in this case.
4. Crl. R.P. Nos. 223 and 239 of 1959 arise out of the same case, C. C. No. 236 of 1959 on the file of the court of the District Magistrate of Tellichery. One K.P. Balakrishnan filed a complaint before the said court against five Police Officers, that is, one Circle Inspector, two Sub-Inspectors, a Head Constable and a Police Constable, under Ss.120-B, 324 and 147 I. P. C. The allegations in the complaint are that, while the complainant was proceeding along the public road in front of the B.E.M.P. High School, Tellichery, he saw two boys lying in front of a State bus and picketing.
There was a crowd on both sides of the road and the complainant approached the crowd. Then the aforesaid Police Officers and about 50 policemen armed with lathies got down from their vehicles and the Circle Inspector shouted "beat all rascals", on which the other accused persons and other constables started beating the people on the road. The complainant was pursued and beaten by the Circle Inspector and by such beating the complainant and others sustained some injuries.
On these allegations the above complaint was filed. The accused Police Officers raised the objection that the complaint shou
