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2013 Supreme(Ker) 271

High Court of Kerala
K.M. JOSEPH & K. RAMAKRISHNAN, JJ.
Praseedha Shiju, Wayanad District
Versus
State Of Kerala, Represented By The Chief Secretary, Government Secretariat & Others
W.P.(Crl.).No. 128 of 2013 (S)
Decided on : 09-05-2013

Advocates appeared:
For the Petitioner:K. Ramakumar, Senior Advocate, S.M. Prasanth, Mrs. Smitha George, Mrs. Asha Babu, Mrs. G. Ashwini, Advocates.
For the Respondents: R1, R2 & R3, T. Asaf Ali, Director General Of Prosecution.

Headnote:Anti - Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (Kerala), Sections 7 (2) 2 (p) (iii) - Constitution of India, 1950, Article 22(5) - It must be specifically defined that the compliant have not been introduced by the police officer in the order of the detention.

JUDGMENT :-

K.M. Joseph, J.

1. Petitioner is the wife of a person who has been detained under the provisions of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Ext.P1 is the order of detention. It is dated 26.12.2012. Ext.P1(a) purports to be the grounds of detention. Ext.P6 is the order of approval by the Government of Kerala. Ext.P8 is the order by which the Government has rejected the representation.

2. We heard Shri K. Ramakumar, learned senior counsel for the petitioner and Shri T. Asaf Ali, learned Director General of Prosecution.

3. The contentions of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner are as follows:

It is contended that under Article 22(5) of the Constitution, the grounds of detention must be supplied to the detenu. It is pointed out that Section 7(2) of the Act also mandates that the grounds of detention specifying the instances of the offences with copies of relevant documents as far as practicable on the basis of which he is considered as a "known goonda" or "known rowdy" and giving such materials relating to his activities on the basis of which his detention has been found necessary, shall be furnished to him as soon as possible, nevertheless, in any case, within five days of detention and he shall also be informed in writing, under acknowledgment, of his right to represent to the Government and before the Advisory Board against the arrest and detention. He would contend that this is a case where the detenu is detained on the basis that he is a known rowdy. It is complained that, however, in Ext.P1(a) grounds of detention, there is no mention of vital particulars. He drew our attention to Section 2(p) of the Act. He would contend that this is a case where clauses (i) and (ii) would not apply.

4. The case of the respondents is based on Section 2(p)(iii) of the Act. Section 2(p)(iii) of the Act reads as follows:

"2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires:-

(p) `Known Rowdy' means any person, who had been, by reason of acts done within the previous seven years as calculated from the date of the order imposing any restriction or detention under this Act;

(iii) found, on investigation or enquiry by a competent police officer or other authority, on complaints initiated by persons other than police officers, in three separate instances not forming part of the same transaction to have committed any offence mentioned in clause (t) of Section 2."

It is, no doubt, followed by a proviso excluding various cases from the purview of the definition of the word "known rowdy". He would contend that in the grounds of detention, there is no mention that the cases have been generated on the basis of complaints initiated by persons other than police officers. He would submit that this is transparent violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution and Section 7(2) of the Act. He would also submit that neither in the order, nor in the grounds of detention, particulars are given ofthe persons who have filed complaints leading to the cases which formed the premise for his detention. He would also submit that there is a well known distinction between law and order and public order. Preventive detention which has the effect of taking away the most precious right of all, namely liberty, is permissible only in cases affecting public order. He would next contend that the District Magistrate who passed the order of detention has not referred to the period of detention. He would draw our attention to the Judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in A. K. Roy v. Union of India and Another (AIR 1982 SC 710) wherein the Apex Court in paragraph 78 held as follows:

"The fact that a person can be detained for the maximum period of 12 months does not place upon the detaining authority the obligation to direct that he shall be detained for the maximum period. The detaining authority can always exercise its discretion regarding the length of the period of



































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