HIGH COURT OF KERALA
K. VINOD CHANDRAN, J.
B. Sathi - Petitioner
Versus
The Labour Court, Kollam & Another - Respondents
W.P.(C).No. 4896 of 2015 (J)
Decided on: 20-03-2015
Industrial Disputes Act 1947 - Section 36( 4) - Advocates Act 1961 - Section 30 - Representation of parties - Who may - Whether party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner in any conciliation proceedings under Act or in any proceedings before a Court - Held, Court is of the opinion that the position is identical insofar as sub-section (4) of Section 36 of the I.D. Act is concerned. The introduction and coming into force of Section 30 of the Advocates Act does not have any impact on the same.
1. The issue arising for consideration herein is whether by enforcement of Section 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961 [for brevity “Advocates Act”]; an Advocate engaged by a party in a proceeding, before a Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [for brevity “ID Act”]; gets an absolute right to appear for and on behalf of the litigant. Would Section 30 of the Advocates Act override the specific restriction in sub-section (4) of Section 36 of the ID Act?
2. The individual management is the petitioner herein and the 2nd respondent is the Secretary of a Union representing a worker in an industrial dispute before the Labour Court. The management was represented by a power of attorney holder, who was incapacitated due to medical complications and, hence, the management sought appearance through a legal practitioner, who was, however, declined consent under sub-section (4) of Section 36 of the ID Act, by the Union.
3. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the management would contend that the issue is covered by the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Saji v. Union of India [2011 (3) KLT 936], wherein the specific effect of introduction of Section 30 was considered. Any restriction, in any of the enactments as in force on the date of notification, for Advocates to appear before a Court, Tribunal or a person legally authorised to take evidence and any authority or person before whom such Advocate is entitled to practice, would be taken away, is the binding precedent. The learned Senior Counsel would also rely on the decisions in Lingappa Pochanna v. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1985 SC 389] and Aeltemesh Rein v. Union of India [(1988) 4 SCC 54] to contend that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has time and again noticed the fact that Section 30, under the Advocates Act, had not been notified and had also taken serious note of the fact that the Legislature had not considered the changing times to bring into force such provision so as to enable Advocates to appear before the Courts, Tribunals and other authority or persons; to enable a proper adjudication of the issues coming up before such authorities. It is also specifically pointed out that Aeltemesh Rein (supra) notices the ID Act, especially Section 36(4), which restricts the appearance of a counsel in an industrial dispute. The Hon'ble Supreme Court also issued a mandamus to the Central Government to consider enforcement of Section 30 of the Advocates Act within a period of six months. A Division Bench decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Paramjit Kumar Saroya v. Union of India and another [CWP-7282-2010 and 12340-2010 (O&M) dated 28.05.2014] has also considered the restriction in the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 to find that the introduction of Section 30 of the Advocates Act would take away such restriction.
4. The learned counsel for the 2nd respondent, however, would rely on another judgment of this Court, authored by me in O.P.(LC).No.6 of 2014 dated 17.02.2014 [A.C. Anandan (Monachan) v. G. Vijayakumar]; where the specific question of the overriding nature of Section 30 of the Advocates Act and the introduction of a notification was considered and it was held, following the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Paradip Port Trust, Paradip v. Their Workmen [AIR 1977 SC 36], that the prohibition in Section 36(4) of the ID Act would not be overridden by the introduction of Section 30 of the Advocates Act.
5. The learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent would point out that sub-section (3) of Section 36 of the ID Act is restrictive in nature and sub-section (4) is not a restriction; but is an enabling provision, which enables any party to be represented by a legal practitioner if the other party consents to it. It is also submitted that sub-section (3) would have no effect to a proceeding in a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, since “Court” is specifically defined unde
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