K.T. Sankaran, J.

1. These Crl RPs were referred to the Division Bench to consider the question whether the Court before which a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short 'the NI Act') was re-presented following the decision of the Supreme Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra and Another, 2014 (3) KHC 362 : 2014 (9) SCC 129 : 2014 (2) KLD 281 : 2014 (3) KLJ 600 : 2014 (3) KLT 605 : ILR 2014 (3) Ker. 771 : 2014 Cri.L.J. 4350 : AIR 2014 SC 3519, beyond the period of 30 days fixed by the Supreme Court in paragraph 22 of the judgment, can condone the delay in re-presenting the complaint. Before the learned Single Judge, the decision in A. Rajagopal Karunan v. Salini Raj and Another, 2015 KHC 2407 : 2015 (1) KLJ 372, wherein another learned Single Judge exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. condoned the delay of 17 days in re-presenting the complaint before the proper Court, was cited. The learned Single Judge doubted the correctness of the decision in A. Rajagopal Karunan's case (supra) and referred the cases to a Division Bench. In all these cases, the complaints were filed before the Courts which had jurisdiction to entertain the complaints in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in K. Bhaskaran v. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan, 1999 KHC 614 : 1999 (7) SCC 510 : 1999 (3) KLT 440 : 2000 (2) KLJ 58 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1284 : AIR 1999 SC 3762 : 1999 Cri.L.J. 4606. In three of the cases (Crl RP No. 76 of 2015, 870 of 2015 and 871 of 2015), there was a delay of 140 days, 10 days and 27 days respectively in filing the complaints, whereas in other cases the complaints were filed within time. The Supreme Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod's case (supra), re-visited the view taken in K. Bhaskaran's case (supra) and held that once the cause of action accrues to the complainant, the jurisdiction of the Court to try the case will be determined by reference to the place where the cheque is dishonoured. The Supreme Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod's case (supra) held thus:

"In this analysis we hold that the place, situs or venue of judicial inquiry and trial of the offence must logically be restricted to where the drawee bank is located.......The territorial jurisdiction is restricted to the Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed, which in the present context is where the cheque is dishonoured by the bank on which it is drawn."

In the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod's case (supra), the Courts where the complaints in the present cases were filed returned the same to the respective complainant for presentation before the proper Court. In the case involved in Crl RP No. 871 of 2015, the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class Court, Chittoor had condoned the delay of 27 days.

2. In Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod's case (supra), the Supreme Court considered the hardship that would be caused to the litigants following the view taken therein and made sufficient safeguards for meeting that situation in paragraph 22, which reads as follows:

"22. We are quite alive to the magnitude of the impact that the present decision shall have to possibly lakhs of cases pending in various Courts spanning across the country. One approach could be to declare that this judgment will have only prospective pertinence i.e., applicability to complaints that may be filed after this pronouncement. However, keeping in perspective the hardship that this will continue to bear on alleged respondent-accused who may have to travel long distances in conducting their defence, and also mindful of the legal implications of proceedings being permitted to continue in a Court devoid of jurisdiction, this recourse in entirety does not commend itself to us. Consequent on considerable consideration we think it expedient to direct that only those cases where, post the summoning and appearance of the alleged accused, the recording of evidence has commenced as envisage