K. Abraham Mathew, J.

1. Petitioner is the plaintiff. The suit was for realization of money borrowed by the 1st defendant and the repayment of which was guaranteed by one Jose. On the death of the latter his legal representatives were impleaded as additional defendants 2 to 4, who are respondents 1 to 3 in this O.P. The 1st defendant failed to appear in the suit and he was set ex parte. Respondents 1 to 3 filed a written statement raising a contention, inter alia, that the suit was barred so far as they are concerned. The suit was posted for trial. Respondents 1 to 3 filed I.A. No. 2331 of 2015 to frame an issue with regard to the question of limitation, whereupon the learned Sub Judge framed an issue and heard it as a preliminary issue. By the impugned 'order' the learned Sub Judge found the issue against the plaintiff and accordingly, she "exonerated" respondents 1 to 3 from the liability, the correctness of which is questioned in this O.P. Heard.

2. The question of maintainability of the revision petition was heard as a preliminary question.

3. The learned Sub Judge found that the suit is barred by the law of limitation so far as respondents 1 to 3 are concerned. Consequently she pronounced the impugned 'order'. The question is whether this decision is an order or judgment. If it is a judgment only on appeal will lie.

4. Section 2(9) C.P.C. defines judgment: "Judgment means the statement given by the judge on the grounds of a decree or order." Thus, judgment is the statement of grounds on the basis of which a decree or order is passed. But this does not mean that there is no distinction between a judgment and order. As seen from Section 2 C.P.C. the definition is applicable only if there is nothing repugnant in the subject or context. Section 33 of the Code also is relevant in this context. It is mandatory for the court to pronounce a judgment after the suit has been heard and it shall be followed by a decree. A decree is passed only if the adjudication conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit. An adjudication which does not conclusively determines the rights of the parties is not a decree. If it is not a decree, the grounds on which it is passed is not a judgment. It is only an order which is not accompanied by a decree.

5. Under Section 96 of the Code an appeal lies only from a decree and not from an order. For the purpose of appeal only an adjudication which requires passing of a decree is called a judgment. Any other adjudication is only an order. Some orders like rejecting a plaint are deemed decrees. But in such case there is no decree, which is why a fiction is created. Unless there is a specific provision in Code, an appeal will not lie against an order. Thus, there is a clear distinction between a judgment and an order.

6. In Tarapore and Co., Madras v. Tractors Export, Moscow, AIR 1970 SC 1168 the Supreme Court examined the meaning of judgment in the context of Article 133(1) of the Constitution of India. The court held that judgment "means a final adjudication by the court of the rights of the parties, and that an interlocutory judgment even if it decides an issue or issues without finally determining the rights and liabilities of the parties is not a judgment, however cardinal the issue may be". An adjudication which brings an end to the litigation between the parties in a suit is a judgment. If after the adjudication on a preliminary issue the trial of the suit is to be proceeded with, it is only an order.

7. Order 14 Rule 2(2) mentions the issues which may be heard as preliminary issues. It should either relate to the jurisdiction of the court or a statutory bar. If the decision depends upon existence of facts which are to be proved at the trial, it cannot be heard as a preliminary issue. If the finding on the preliminary issue is that the court has no jurisdiction or the suit is barred by the law of limitation, it is liable to be dis