SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

2016 Supreme(Ker) 283

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
K.T. SANKARAN & K.P. JYOTHINDRANATH, JJ.
P. JAYARAJAN – Appellant
Versus
STATE, THE CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, SPECIAL CRIME BRANCH, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM – Respondent
CRL Appeal No. 125 of 2016
Decided On : 11-02-2016

Advocates Appeared:
For the Appellant : SRI. M.K. DAMODARAN, SRI. K. GOPALAKRISHNA KURUP, SRI. ALAN PAPALI, SRI. K. VISWAN, SRI. GILBERT GEORGE CORREYA, SRI. A. VELAPPAN NAIR, SRI. ANTONY ROBERT DIAS, SRI. NISHIL P.S. & SRI. J. VIMAL, ADVS.
For the Respondent: SRI. P. CHANDRASEKHARAN PILLAI, STANDING COUNSEL FOR CBI, SMT. BINDHU GOPINATH, PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, SRI. S. RAJEEV, SRI. K.K. DHEERENDRAKRISHNAN & SRI. V. VINAY, ADVS.

Headnote:

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 - S. 15 - Definition of - Bomb - Terrorist activity -Unlawful act - Whether activity attracting ingredients of Section 15 would be terrorist act - Whether large scale incidents of loss of hundred or thousands of lives or destruction of property regarded as bomb death - Whether death or injury of single person can also be covered under terrorist act - Claiming for bail - When granted - Appeal against conviction - Held, It would be sufficient if death or injury is caused to any person or persons or loss or damage or destruction of property is occurred in order to attract Section 15 of the U.A.P. Act. We cannot interpret Section 15 to mean only large scale incidents of loss of hundreds or thousands of lives or destruction of property worth crores of Rupees. No such standard is prescribed in Section 15. Any activity which attracts the ingredients of Section 15 would be a terrorist act notwithstanding the dimension of the same- The word 'bomb' is not defined nor any standard is fixed for the destructive potential of the same so as to attract Section 15 - The contention that no death is caused as a result of the hurling of the bomb, is also irrelevant. - The expression "in the people or any section of the people in India" occurring in Section 15(1) does not mean that thousands of people should be the affected persons. It is sufficient if a small section of the people were to be affected. What is aimed at is the prevention of terrorist activities and, for that purpose, the terrorist act is defined. We are not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the activity alleged against the accused does not satisfy the definition of 'terrorist act' within the meaning of Section 15 of the U.A.P. Act - Simply because an offence under the U.A.P. Act is alleged, it cannot be said that the bar under Section 43-D(4) would apply and prima facie to found the allegation against the accused that he committed the offence under the U.A.P. Act. If that test is over, the bar under Section 43-D(4) will apply and the application for anticipatory bail will not be maintainable

JUDGMENT :

K.T. SANKARAN, J.

1. The Criminal Appeal is filed by accused No. 25 in RC.10(s)/2014/CBI/SCB/TVPM on the file of the Court of Session, Thalassery, by which the learned Sessions Judge dismissed the application for anticipatory bail filed by accused No. 25 under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Accused No.25 (P. Jayarajan) had filed Crl.M.C.No.989 of 2015, on the file of the Court of Sessions, Thalassery, for anticipatory bail. But, that application was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge as per the order dated 24.7.2015. Again, accused No.25 filed Crl.M.C.No.83 of 2016 for the same relief and the learned Sessions Judge dismissed the same as per the order dated 19.1.2016. At the time when the first and second applications were dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge, P. Jayarajan was not arraigned as an accused in the case. Later, as per the report dated 21.1.2016 filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter referred to as 'CBI'), P. Jayarajan was arraigned as accused No.25. Thereafter, he filed Crl.M.C.No.190 of 2016 and it was dismissed by the court below as per the order dated 30.1.2016, which is under challenge in this Criminal Appeal.

2. On 1.9.2014, the incident alleged in the case occurred, in which a person (Elamthottathil Manoj) was murdered and another (Pramod) was seriously injured. In respect of the incident, Crime No.780 of 2014 was registered at Kathirur Police Station. Subsequently, investigation of the case was taken over by the CBI. The CBI re-registered the case on 28.10.2014 and took over investigation of the case on 5.11.2014. On 7.3.2015, the CBI filed a final report dated 6.3.2015, in which accused Nos.1 to 19 were arraigned as accused. Later, the CBI filed a report dated 9.7.2015 and accused Nos.20 to 24 were added. As stated earlier, the appellant (P. Jayarajan) was arraigned as accused No.25 as per the report dated 21.1.2016 filed by the CBI. The offences alleged against the accused are under Sections 120B read with Sections 143, 147, 148, 201, 212, 324, 307 and 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code; Sections 3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act; Section 27 of the Arms Act and Section 16(a) read with Section 15(1)(a)(i) and 19 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'UAP Act'). It is submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the CBI that subsequently Section 18 of the UAP Act was also included as an item of offence against the accused.

3. The first application for anticipatory bail filed by the appellant was dismissed by the court below on 24.7.2015, holding that Section 43-D(4) and 43-D(5) of the UAP Act would be a bar to the maintainability of the application for anticipatory bail. The second application for anticipatory bail was dismissed by the court below on 19.1.2016 stating that the earlier application was dismissed on the ground of the bar under Section 43-D(4) and 43-D (5) of the UAP Act and the Court cannot review its own order. It was also held that there was no change of circumstances. In the present order which is under challenge, the court below held that in view of the orders passed earlier, the Court would not be justified in allowing the application as the orders cannot be reviewed in the third application.

4. Since it was likely that the arguments by both sides might be on the basis of the maintainability of the third application for anticipatory bail, we suggested to both sides that the matter can be disposed of on the merits rather than on the ground of technicalities. By adopting such a method, the question whether the appellant is entitled to anticipatory bail, whether there is a bar under Section 43-D(4) and whether the application can be entertained in view of the provisions of Section 43-D(5) can be considered independently. By adopting that method, the apprehension of the appellant that his bail application was not considered on the merits even after the CBI filed a report dated 21.1.20
























































Click Here to Read the rest of this document

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top