The main legal point established in the judgment is that the service of notice through post on the counsel does not amount to proper service on the party, and Rule 5(b) is mandatory in its scope and ambit.

Dama Seshadri Naidu, J.

Introduction:

An order of the Appellate Tribunal under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (‘the Act’) is challenged in this Appeal. Procedurally, an appeal to this Court lies in sixty days under Section 42 of the Act; the period is extendable by sixty more days-120 days in total. The Act casts a burden on the Appellate Tribunal to communicate the order either to the appellant or her authorized agent depending on the method of service.

2. Here the order was served on the appellant's counsel. There arose some delay in the appellant's coming to know of it. She filed this appeal taking alternative pleas: 1. There is no delay from the date of her knowledge about the order; 2. If there is delay, it needs to be condoned as there are justifiable reasons. This appeal raises these issues: Has the Tribunal properly served the order on the party? Is there any delay? Does the procedure prescribed in the Prevention of Money-Laundering (Appeal) Rules, 2005 (‘the Rules') in conflict with that provided in the principal enactment?

Dispute:

3. The appellant is the defendant in the Original Complaint No.308 of 2014 before the adjudicating authority under the Act. Shorn of extraneous particulars, we may observe that initially the adjudicating authority passed an order provisionally attaching the appellant's property-residential house. Subsequently the order of provisional attachment was confirmed through a final order dated 28.8.2014. Aggrieved, the appellant, invoking Section 26 of the Act, filed an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal in FPAPMLA639/Cochin/2014. On 5.8.2015, the Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal. Later, the appellant filed this appeal along with an application to condone the delay if any.

4. The appellant's primary contention is that the appeal was filed within time under Section 42 of the Act for she obtained the certified copies from her counsel recently, i.e. on 11.1.2016. Nevertheless, the appellant has filed this interlocutory application as a matter of abundant caution: The delay, if any, to a tune of 102 days, may be condoned because there are justifiable grounds. The respondent has joined the issue by filing a counter affidavit.

5. Before proceeding further, we may have to ascertain whether there is any delay to be condoned. As seen from Section 42 of the Act, any person aggrieved by any decision of the Appellate Tribunal may appeal to this Court within sixty days from the date the Appellate Tribunal's decision is communicated. The proviso adds that the period for appealing can be extended by sixty more days. The total period for filing an appeal, therefore, is 120 days from the date of communication,

6. If we were to conclude that there was a delay, it would exceed 120 days as has been contended by the respondent. Then, the appeal would be hopelessly barred by time because the court has not been vested with any power of discretion to condone the delay beyond the maximum permissible period: 120 days. So, the moot question is whether the Appellate Tribunal has served its order on the appellant on time. It is an admitted fact on either side that a copy of the order was served through speed post on the appellant's counsel appearing before the Appellate Tribunal, then, The record reveals that a copy of the order was enclosed to a covering letter dated 7.8.2015 (Annexure R1(a)).

7. If we assume that it was dispatched on the same day, it could have, probably, reached the appellant's counsel in fifteen days. For, according to the respondent, it was not returned undelivered. So the respondent legitimately tries to draw a presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act that the copy of the order was duly served on the counsel within time. The question, then, is whether service of notice or order on the counsel amounts to its proper service on the party to the proceedings.

Submissions:

Appellant's :

8. Sri. Ramesh Chander, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, has stre