K. Harilal, J.

The petitioner is the Judgment Debtor/tenant against whom an Execution Petition was filed under Sec.14 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short the Act'), for executing an order of eviction passed under Sec.11(8) of the Act and the respondent is the Decree Holder/landlord therein.

2. The petitioner resisted the said Execution Petition contending that it was hopelessly barred by the law of limitation as the same was filed 10 years after passing of the order. According to him, the Execution Petition should have been filed within a 'reasonable time', as held by the Single Bench of this Court in Devaki v. First Additional District Judge [1998 (1) KLT 818]. It was also contended that the subsequent events, after passing of the order of eviction, have obliterated the bona fide need put forward in the Rent Control Petition. Now, the petitioner's son is conducting the Institute for which the order of eviction was sought for under Sec.11(8) of the Act, in a plot having 25 cents purchased by him for this purpose and that event obliterated the need for eviction.

3. The respondent contended that the period of limitation for executing an order passed under Section 11 of the Act is governed by Article 136 of the Limitation Act, by virtue of the 'deeming provision' in Section 14 of the Act and thereby, the period of limitation is 12 years and that the Execution Petition was filed within the said period, as held by another Single Bench of this Court in M.V. Ali v. Kunjannamma Philipose [1975 KLT 527].

4. After considering the rival contentions, the Execution Court rejected the aforesaid contention raised by the petitioner and issued a delivery notice. In the revision preferred by the petitioner/tenant, the learned District Judge elaborately considered the rival contentions, in the light of both the decisions referred above and confirmed the order passed by the learned Munsiff relying on the decision in M.V. Ali's case (supra). This OP(RC) is filed challenging the legality of the concurrent findings of the courts below and doubting the reliability and correctness of M.V. Ali's case, on which the courts below placed reliance.

5. In view of the divergent views expressed by the two Single Benches of this Court, in the decisions referred above, we have appointed Advocate Sri. Harish to aid and assist us to examine the correctness of the divergent views of the different Single Benches of this Court and to set the divergecy at rest.

6. Heard. Sri. Azad Babu, the learned counsel for the petitioner, advanced a two fold argument. In addition to the contention that the Execution Petition should have been filed within a 'reasonable time'; alternatively, it was contended that if the Limitation Act is applicable, Art.137 of the Limitation Act would come into play, as specific period of limitation is not provided in the Act or the Limitation Act for filing an Execution Petition.

7. The learned Amicus Curiae advanced arguments exhaustively in support of the proposition laid down in M.V. Ali's case and cited the decisions reported in Aneeta Hada vs. M/s Godfather Travel and Tours Pvt. Ltd., [AIR 2012 SC 2795] and State of Bombay v. Pandurang Vinayak and Others [AIR 1953 SC 244] to fortify his argument. Sri. Hariharaputhran also advanced arguments to justify the concurrent findings of the courts below.

8. First of all, we shall deal with the divergent views of the Single Benches of this Court in the same question of law. In M.V. Ali's case (supra), the learned single Judge of this Court held that the expression "as if it were a decree passed by him", in Section 14 of the Act would make an order of eviction a decree of the Munsiff and therefore, such a construction would attract not only the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, dealing with execution of the decrees, but also the provisions of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes the period of limitation for execution of the decree. Under Article