The main legal point established is that when a decree is appealed from, and the Superior Court either affirms or modifies or reverses the decree passed by the lower Court, it results in a merger of the lower Court's decree with that of the Superior Court, and the decree which would thereafter be executable would be the decree of the Superior Court.

Mr. P. Bhavadasan, J.

Unfortunate events gave rise to more than 200 suits relating to the affairs of Malankara Church. On several occasions this Court hoped that the two factions of Malankara Church would see reasons and will have the wisdom to bring about an amicable settlement and things would become smooth and atmosphere peaceful. Though a Single Bench of this Court at the time of disposal of about 8 suits by a common judgment expressed the hope that the judgment of this Court would give a quietus, irrational, illogical and unnecessary disputes and litigation's continued between the two factions and an end is far from sight. The factions became more and more belligerent and the atmosphere more and more tense. Even the decision by the Apex Court does not appear to be capable of putting an end to the litigations and almost every day some action from the side of either of the groups give rise to fresh disputes and discords and the litigations continue to proliferate.

2. OS 1 of 1979, out of which the present execution proceedings arise, was dismissed along with all other suits. Appeals were preferred and by judgment dated 01/06/1990 a Division Bench of this Court allowed the appeals and passed decrees in the suits, which will be referred to later.

3. The matter was carried in appeal to the Apex Court and the Apex Court disposed of the appeals by a common judgment reported in P.M.A. Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma, AIR 1995 SC 2001 : 1995 KHC 449 : 1995 (2) KLT SN 37 : 1995 Supp (4) SCC 286 : 1995 AIR SCW 3131 : 1995 AIR SCW 3133. A fresh decree was passed and there were two subsequent modifications to the decree passed by the Apex Court. The subsequent decisions are reported in P.M.A. Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma Mathews, AIR 1996 SC 3121 : 1996 KHC 1632 : 1996 (8) SCC 470 and by Rev. P.M.A. Metropolitan v. Moran Mar Marthoma Mathews, AIR 1997 SC 1034. The decree passed by the Apex Court consists of three parts.

4. The decree-holders in OS 1 of 1979 have filed EP 1 of 1980. In the execution petition it is averred that the judgment-debtors shown to the execution petition are violating the order of permanent prohibitory injunction passed by this Court while decreeing the suits in appeal and it has become necessary to execute the decree so as to prevent them from doing so. The summary of the decrees and the mode of execution are made mention of in the execution petition.

5. The judgment-debtors opposed the execution petition mainly on the ground that what is sought to be executed is the decree passed by the Division Bench of this Court, which has been superseded by the decision of the Apex Court. According to them, there is no executable decree passed by the Division Bench in existence as of now and therefore the execution petition is not maintainable. The complaint now raised by the decree-holders is covered by part 2 of the decree passed by the Apex Court and in the light of the said portion of the decree, nothing further remains and the E.P. is only to be dismissed. Another contention taken by the judgment-debtors is that the decree drawn up is not in tune with the judgment of this Court and therefore the decree cannot be executed. Further contention is that the defendants in OS 1 of 1979 were not shown in a representative capacity and therefore the decree in the said suit at best can bind only the parties to the suit and neither Section 11 Explanation 6 nor 1, Rule 8 can be attracted to the facts of the case. It is specifically averred that the proceedings in OS 1 of 1979 will not show that the defendants in the suit were sued in a representative capacity and if that be so, only the first and second judgment-debtors were parties to the suit and other judgment-debtors shown were not parties to OS 1 of 1979 and decree can bind only defendants 1 and 2. It is also contended that even assuming that the defendants in the suit were sued in a representative capacity, since judgment-debtors 3 to 9 were not eonominee parties