The petitioner was convicted and sentenced under Sections 419, 468 and 471 I.P.C. and Section 12(1)(d) of the Passports Act, 1967 concurrently by the courts below.

2. The prosecution allegation is that on 13.2.2004 at 5.45 a.m., when the revision petitioner arrived at Kochi International Airport from Abudhabi, the revision petitioner was found in possession of passport in the name of Hameed Hajabba Beary, New House, Shirilalu P.O., Belthangady, Karnataka State with the photograph of the revision petitioner.

3. Before the trial court, PW1 to PW12 were examined and Exts.P1 to P15 were marked for the prosecution. No evidence was adduced from the side of the revision petitioner.

4. Heard.

5. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner has argued that since the accused had been convicted and sentenced under Section 12(1)(d) of the Passports Act, the accused should not have been convicted and sentenced for the offence under Sections 419, 468 and 471 I.P.C. in view of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act.

6. The learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, has argued that since the ingredients to constitute the offence under the Passports Act and the ingredients to constitute the offence under the Indian Penal Code are distinct and separate, the conviction and sentence passed by the courts below are fully justified.

7. In this context, it is relevant to extract Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which is extracted hereunder:-

“26. Provision as to offences punishable under two or more enactments:- Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.”

It is clear from the provisions of Section 26 of the General Clauses Act that if the act committed is an offence under two enactments, there is no bar in proceeding against the accused under two enactments, but the accused cannot be sentenced for the same separately, if the offences are not distinct and separate.

8. In State of Bombay v. S.L. Apte (AIR 1961 SC 578), referring to section 26 of the General Clauses Act, the Apex Court observed thus in paragraph 16:-

“Though Section 26 in its opening words refers to “the act or omission constituting an offence under two or more enactments”, the emphasis is not on the facts alleged in the two complaints but rather on the ingredients which constitute the two offences with which a person is charged. This is made clear by the concluding portion of the section which refers to “shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.”

If the offences are not the same but are distinct, the ban imposed by this provision also cannot be invoked. It therefore follows that in the present case as the respondents are not being sought to be punished for “the same offence” twice but for two distinct offences constituted or made up of different ingredients, the bar of the provision is inapplicable.”

9. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Om Parkash Gupta v. State of UP (AIR 1957 SC 458 : 1957 KHC 608) considered the question as to whether Section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of corruption Act had impliedly repealed sections 405 and 409 of the I.P.C. dealing with misappropriation by a public servant and held that since the two offences are distinct and separate, one would not repeal the other.

10. In State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan and others (AIR 1989 SC 1 : 1988 KHC 1071), the Apex court considered the question as to whether the offence under Section 9(1) read with Section 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 and Section 429 of the Indian Penal Code would be mutually exclusive and whether the earlier Act would override the general provisions of the Indian Penal Code dealing with the same subject and held that they are distinct and separate.

11. The Apex Court in Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat and another (AIR 2012 SC 2