A landowner has a natural right to lateral support from adjacent land, and levelling the land does not alter its natural state. The loss of lateral support is caused by excavation or removal of soil from adjacent land, not by levelling the land.

Chettur Sankaran Nair, J.

1. This Appeal by the plaintiff is directed against the Judgement and Decree of the Courts below, rejecting her claim for lateral support. Plaintiff runs a School since 1968 in Survey No. 1054 of Kandanassery Village, described as A schedule property in the plaint. Defendants own lands to the west and north of plaintiff's property, described as B scheduled property, in the plaint. Plaintiff submits that defendants had been making large scale excavation of earth from their property, cutting earth in a perpendicular. As a result of this, plaintiffs property has lost lateral support available from the adjacent land of defendants, submits plaintiff. Hence a suit for mandatory and prohibitory injunction was filed.

2. Defendants admitted removal of earth, but contended the plaintiff lost lateral support, if at all, by putting pressure on her land by heaping earth on the playground, and not by any act of the defendants. They submit further that S.7 of the Indian Easement Act, stands in the way of plaintiff claiming lateral support, after subjecting her land to artificial pressure.

3. The Suit was dismissed by the trial court. On Appeal (A.S.2/81), the District Court, Trichur remanded the suit to the trial court to ascertain, if:

"plaintiff had imposed additional burden on A schedule property by raising the level of the play ground at the north - western corner touching B schedule property."

The order of remand was challenged before this Court in a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal, but unsuccessfully. The trial court, than proceeded with the suit, and appointed an Advocate Commissioner. The Commissioner filed Ext. C16 Report dated 10-12-1984 and Ext.C17 plan. He noted that plaint A scheduled property was not overburdened by putting any additional quantity of earth on it. According to him, the play ground was levelled by plaintiff, by taking earth from the north-western part of her land, and spreading it over the south-western part of the land.

4. The trial court dismissed the suit, holding that the play ground had been levelled, and that:

"plaintiff has imposed additional burden over her own property by constructing School and play ground in the year 1968, whereby the lateral support is lost."

The plaintiff appealed, but to no avail. The District Judge observed:

"It is clear that plaintiff had overburdened plaint A scheduled property for the purpose of levelling the play ground, touching B Scheduled property."

5. Counsel for appellant submits that the courts below misdirected themselves on facts and law, and that the trial court enlarged the scope of remand, making a roving enquiry, as in an open remand. Counsel states that the scope of remand was correctly appreciated by the courts below. He relied on the decisions in C.N. Ambrose v. Meemkshy (1953 TC 111), Chacko v. Varkey (1962 KLT 731), Achuthan v. Raman and otters (1979 KLT 119) and George Kutty v. Ouseph Varkey (1990 (1) KLT 452) to contend that the trial court cannot travel beyond the order of remand, or enter on alien pastures.

6. It is settled law that the trial court will have no jurisdiction to reopen issues decided by it, unless so directed by a superior court, and such consideration can only be to the extent and in the manner indicated by the appellate court. Consideration on ren and, is thus bounded by the terms of the order of remand itself. If it is an open remand, a 1 he issues are open to fresh consideration - not otherwise.

7. In the case on hand, the remand was limited to one question, namely whether the plaintiff had burdened plaint A scheduled property at its north-western corner, touching plaint B scheduled property. The trial court said:

"Now it has come out in evidence that the plaintiff herself had imposed additional burden over her own property by constructing the school and play ground.".

The appellate court stated:

"I agree with the lower court that plaintiff over burdened plaint A scheduled property near Plaint B scheduled property".

8. There