The main legal point established in the judgment is that the Land Tribunal and the appellate authority have the power to rectify procedural mistakes, but cannot review decisions entered on merits.

P.A. Mohammed, J.

1. The petitioner in this writ petition claims to be a 'cultivating tenant' in respect of five acres of land. He filed an application O. A. No 240/71 before the Land Tribunal for assignment of jenmom rights under S.72B of the Kerala Land Reforms Act (for short 'the Act'). That application was dismissed on the ground that respondents 1 and 2 had already obtained purchase certificate in respect of the very same land. As against the said order of the Land Tribunal, the petitioner filed an appeal before the third respondent under S.102 of the Act. That appeal happened to be dismissed on the ground of a submission made by the petitioner's counsel to the effect that appeal was not pressed. Ext. P1 is the copy of the judgment. Since the submission made before the Appellate Authority was due to an inadvertent mistake on the part of the counsel, the petitioner prepared a review petition and attempted to file it before the Appellate Authority. Ext. P2 is the copy of the said review petition. However that petition was not entertained by the office and it was returned without assigning any reason. It was in that situation the present writ petition was filed. (The original of the review petition along with the Vakalath of the advocate was separately produced in this original petition).

2. Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as the Government Pleader on behalf of the respondents 3 and 4. Though the notice was taken out to respondents 1 and 2, there was no appearance on behalf of them.

3. The main contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that the Appellate Authority has ample power to review its own order or correct an inadvertent mistaken submission. Argument is that manifest injustice would be caused to the petitioner in case Ext. P1 judgment is not allowed to be corrected as prayed for. He further pleads that the provisions of the Act do not authorise the Appellate Authority to review its own order and therefore the remedy under Art.226 and 227 alone is available.

4. The Supreme Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi and others v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji (AIR 1970 SC 1273) while dealing with power of review observed:

"It is well settled that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication.'.

However, this decision was distinguished by the Supreme Court in Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal (AIR 1981 SC 696) as below:

"We are unable to appreciate the contention that merely because the ex parte award was based on the statement of the manager of the appellant, the order setting aside the ex parte award, in fact, amounts to review. The decision in Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji AIR 1970 SC 1273 is distinguishable. It is an authority for the proposition that the power of review is not an inherent power, it must be conferred either specifically or by necessary implication. Sub-s.(1) and (3) of S.11 of the Act themselves make a distinction between procedure and powers of the Tribunal under the Act, while the procedure is left to be devised by the Tribunal to suit carrying out its functions under the Act, the powers of civil court conferred upon it are clearly defined. The question whether a party must be heard before it is proceeded against is one of procedure and not of power in the sense in which the words are used in S.11. The answer to the question is, therefore, to be found in sub-s.(1) of S.11 and not in sub-s.(3) of S.11. Furthermore, different considerations arise on review. The expression 'review' is used in two distinct senses, namely, (1) a procedural review which is either inherent or implied in a court or Tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under a misapprehension by it, and (2) a review on merits when the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record. It is in the latter sense that the Court in Narshi Thakershi's case held