The court emphasized the presumption of constitutionality of an enactment and the need for a rational relation between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration.

M.S. Menon, J.

1. The petitioner has been assessed to agricultural income tax for the assessment year 1958-59 under the Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1950. This petition challenges the validity of that assessment under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

2. The assessment order concerned is Ext. P1 dated 10-3-1959. The notices demanding the tax and surcharge are Exts. P. 4 and P. 5 dated 21-3-1959.

3. The State's power to impose taxes on agricultural income is derived from Entry 46 in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. According to Article 366(1) of the Constitution "agricultural income" means "agricultural income as defined for the purpose of the enactments relating to Indian Income Tax". The definition of "agricultural income" in S.2(1)(a) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, is "any rent or revenue derived from land which is used for agricultural purposes, and is either assessed to land revenue in the taxable territories or subject to a local rate assessed and collected by officers of the Government as such".

4. S.2(a)(1) of the Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1950, defines "Agricultural Income" as "any rent or revenue derived from land which is used for agricultural purposes". The definition does not contain the words "and is either assessed to land revenue in the taxable territories or subject to a local rate assessed and collected by officers of the Government as such" occuring in S.2(1)(a) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, and the first contention before us is that the omission of those words of restriction is fatal to the validity of the Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1950

5. We are not inclined to accept the contention. In AIR 1941 F. C. 72 it was contended that the word "property" used in the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, did not distinguish between agricultural land and other property, that it was not limited in terms to the latter and that as a result the Act was beyond the competence of the Indian Legislature in so far as its operation might affect agricultural land in the Governors' Provinces. It was also contended that if the Act were held to be in part beyond the competence of the Indian Legislature, its provisions were not severable and so could not even affect property other than agricultural land. Gwyer C. J. said :

"No doubt, if the Act does affect agricultural land in the Governors 'Provinces, it was beyond the competence of the Legislature to enact it; and whether or not it does so must depend upon the meaning which is to be given to the word 'property' in the Act. If that word necessarily and inevitably comprises all forms of property, including agricultural land, then clearly the Act went beyond the powers of the Legislature; but when a legislature with limited and restricted powers makes use of a word of such wide and general import, the presumption must surely be that it is using it with reference to that kind of property with respect to which it is competent to legislate and to no other. The question is thus one of construction, and unless the Act is to be regarded as wholly meaningless and ineffective; the Court is bound to construe the word 'property' as referring only to those forms of property with respect to which the Legislature which enacted the Act was competent to legislate; that is to say, property other than agricultural land.";

and:

"On this view of the matter, the so - called question of severability on which a number of Dominion decisions, as well as decisions of the Judicial Committee, were cited in the course of the argument does not arise. The Court does not seek to divide the Act into two parts, viz., the part which the Legislature was competent, and the part which it was incompetent, to enact. It holds that, on the true construction of the Act, and especially of the word 'property' as used in it, no part of the Act was beyond the Legislature's powers. There is a general presumption that a Legislature does not intend to exceed its jurisdiction; and t