Back
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
BUDHAN CHOUDHRY
Versus
State of Bihar
Decided on December 2, 1954
Held: (I) It is now well-established that while article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid, reasonable c1assificasion for the purposes of legislation. In order however, to pass the test of reasonable classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely J (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons of things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases; namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration.1
(2) It is also well-established that article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure.
(3) Section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1908, does not contravene Art. 14 of the Constitution.2 The effect of the State Government investing the District Magistrate or any Magistrate of the first class with S. 30 powers is to bring into being an additional court in which all offences not punishable with death become triable. In other words, the effect of the exercise of authority by the State Government under Section 30 is, as it were to add in the r 8th column of the second schedule the Magistrate so empowered as a Court before whom all offences not punishable with death will also be triable.
There is an obvious classification in which this section is based, namely, that such power may be conferred on specified Magistrates in
1. (1950) S.C.R. 869: (1951) S.C.R. 682: (1952) S.C.R. 284; (1952) S.C.R. 4-35 ; (1952) S.C.R, 710 : (1953) S.C.R. 581 ; (1953) S.C.R. 661 appliqué,
2. A.P. 1954 Pat. 218 affirmed.
certain localities only and in respect of some offences only, namely all offences other than those punishable with death. The Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its Own people which may vary from place to place. A classification may be based on geographical or territorial considerations.1
The section only authorises the State Government to invest certain Magistrates with power to try all offences not punishable with death and this authority the State can exercise only in the specified places. If the State invests any Magistrate with powers under section 30, anybody who commits any offence not punishable with death and triable by a Court of Sessions under section 28 read with the second schedule is also liable to be tried by the section 30 Magistrate. The risk of such liability falls alike upon all persons committing such an offence. Therefore, there is no discrimination in the section itself.
The contention that although the section itself may not be discriminatory, it may land itself to abuse bringing about a discrimination between persons accused of offences of the same kind, for the police may send up a person accused of an offence under section 366 to a section 30 Magistrate and the police may send another person accused of an offence under the same section to a Magistrate who can commit the accused to the Court of Sessions, cannot hold good. The ultimate decision as to whether a person charged under section 366 shall be tried by the Court of Sessions or by a section 30 Magistrate does not depend merely on the whim or idiosyncrasies of the police or the executive Government, but depends ultimately on the proper exercise of judicial discretion by the Magistrate concerned. The judicial decision must of necessity depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular case and what may superficially appear to be an unequal application of the law may not necessarily amount to a denial of equal protection of law unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional and purposeful discrimination.2 Further, the discretion of Judicial Officers is not arbitrary and the law provides for revision by superior Courts of orders passed by the Subordinate Courts. In such circumstances, there is hardly any ground for apprehending any capricious discrimination by judicial tribunals. - Section 30-Not inconsistent with Article 14 of the Constitution. See under "Constitution of India".
Judgment
S. R. DAS, JJ.
( 1 ) THIS is an appeal from a judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Patni which raises a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India.
( 2 ) THE appeal arises out of a criminal trial held in the district of Hazaribagh in the State of Bihar. The case against the appellants was investigated by the local police and on the 4/06/1951 a challan was submitted before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate passed the following order in the order-sheet :
"let the record be sent to the Dy. Commr. , Hazaribagh for transferring it to the file of the Spl. Magistrate for trial".
ON the record being placed before the Deputy Commissioner, the latter passed the following order :
"perused S. D. O. s order-sheet Withdrawn and transferred to the file of Mr. S. F. Azam, Magistrate with powers u/s 30, Cr. P. C. for favour of disposal. "
THE appellants were then tried by Mr. S. F. Azam, Magistrate of the first class exercising powers under S. 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on charges under Sections 366 and 143 of the Indian Penal Code and each of them was convicted under both the sections and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for five years under S. 366, Indian Penal Code, no separate sentence having been passed under S. 143.
( 3 ) THE appellants preferred an appeal to the High Court of Judicature at Patna. The appeal was heard by a Bench consisting of S. K. Das and C. P. Sinha, JJ. There was a difference of opinion between the two learned Judges as to the constitutionality of S. 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. S. K. Das, J. , took the view that the impugned section did not bring about any discrimination or inequality between persons similarly circumstanced and consequently did not offend the equal protection clause of the Constitution, while C. P. Sinha, J. , was of the opinion that the section was hit by Article 14.
THE appeal was thereupon placed before Reuben, C. J. , who in agreement with S. K. Das. J. , held that S. 30 did not violate the inhibition of Article 14. The learned Chief Justice upheld he conviction but reduced the sentence. On application by the appellants the High Court granted them a certificate under Article 132 (1) and the present appeal has been filed accordingly.
( 4 ) THE learned Advocate appearing in support of the appeal contends before us, as was done before the High Court, that there had been an infraction of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the appellants under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The complaint is that the appellants had been tried by a S. 30 Magistrate and not, by a Court of Session. A Section 30 Magistrate is enjoined by that section to try the case brought before him as a Magistrate and accordingly in cases like the present case he will follow the warrant procedure which is different from the procedure followed by a Court of Session.
THE substance of the grievance is that a trial before the Sessions Judge is much more advantageous to the accused person in that he gets the benefit of the commitment proceedings before a Magistrate and then a trial below the Sessions Judge with the aid of the jury or assessors. It has not been seriously questioned before us that in spite of the risk of imposition of a punishment heavier than what a S. 30 Magistrate can inflict, a trial by a Sessions Judge is of greater advantage to the accused than a trial before a Magistrate under the warrant procedure. We have therefore, to see whether this apparent discrimination offends against the equal protection clause of our Constitution.
( 5 ) THE provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution have come up for discussion before this Court in a number of cases, namely,- charanjit Lal v. Union of India , : - state of Bombay, v. F. N. Balsara , ; - state of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar - kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra : lachmandas Kewalram v. State of Bombay , and- qasim Razvi v. State of Hyderabad . and - hab
An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers
Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance
Scan Me!
India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!
For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :
Back to top
