Service of a dismissal order constitutes part of the cause of action, thereby conferring jurisdiction to the court where the order was received under Article 226(2) of the Constitution.

A.M. Shaffique, J.

1. The writ appeal is filed by the petitioner in O.P. 25142/1998 challenging the judgment of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground that this Court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition as no part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of this court.

2. The facts involved in the writ petition disclose that the appellant while working as Asst. Manager of the 1st respondent bank at Coimbatore was served with two charge sheets for certain misconducts. The enquiry officer found that the charges were not fully proved. But the disciplinary authority dismissed the appellant from service based on further appreciation of evidence. Though an appeal was filed, the same came to be dismissed and further review also ended in dismissal. It is challenging the proceedings of the dismissal that the writ petition is filed. The impugned orders are Ext. P1, the suspension order, Ext.P13, the order passed by the disciplinary authority dismissing the appellant from service, Ext.P16, order of the appellate authority and Ext.P20, the order in review.

3. The first respondent bank raised a preliminary objection inter alia contending that all disciplinary proceedings in relation to the appellant were taken outside the jurisdiction of this Court and no part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the State of Kerala.

4. According to the appellant, though he was employed at Coimbatore when the alleged incident occurred resulting in the memo of charges and the enquiry was held at Coimbatore, in view of the fact that the petitioner received the order of dismissal from service Ext.P13, at his last known address at Kottayam in the State of Kerala, part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court. Reliance was placed on Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India which inter alia indicates that if whole or part of cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Court, the said Court will have jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.

5. The learned Single Judge relied upon a Full Bench judgment of this Court in Naik Nakul Deo Singh v. The Deputy Commandant, CISF, Kottayam [1999 (3) KLT 629], especially paragraph 21 of the said judgment and had come to the conclusion that place of service of the order of dismissal by the disciplinary authority does not amount to a cause of action for invoking the jurisdiction of this court.

6. The appellant himself argued the case. The main contention urged by the appellant is that when the order of dismissal takes effect only on service of the order of dismissal to the employee, the place where the said order of dismissal become effective, forms part of a cause of action and therefore this court has jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition.

7. It is not in dispute that the order of dismissal Ext.P13 was served on the appellant at Kottayam in the State of Kerala. Therefore, the only point that requires to be considered in this appeal is whether service of notice of dismissal at a particular place will amount to a cause of action at that particular place. The appellant relies upon the following judgments:

(i) State of Punjab v. Amarsingh Harika (AIR 1966 SC 1313) is a Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court wherein it is held as under:

"It is plain that the mere passing of an order of dismissal would not be effective unless it is published and communicated to the officer concerned. If the appointing authority passed an order of dismissal, but does not communicate it to the officer concerned, theoretically, it is possible that unlike in the case of a judicial order pronounced in Court, the authority may change its mind and decide to modify its order"

The Supreme Court in Amarsingh Harika (supra) was considering the question as to whether dismissal of plaintiff from the service of the defendant was illegal, void and ultra vires on account of the fact that the order of di