A.M. Shaffique, J.

By reference order dated 3.10.2017, a Division Bench of this Court had doubted the correctness of decisions in L.A.A. Nos. 251 of 2011, 645 of 2012 and 919 of 2009.

2. The short facts arising in the case are as under :

The appeal is filed against the judgment and decree dated 27.05.2010 in L.A.R.No.22 of 2008. The appeal is filed with a petition to condone the delay of 2282 days in filing the appeal.

3. When the appeal came up for admission it was pointed out by the learned Government Pleader that the entire matter has been settled out of court in Lok Adalat Case No.1532 of 2011 and therefore the appeal is not maintainable. The Division Bench which heard the appeal observed that, since the amount decreed has been settled in full and final settlement towards the claim in the land acquisition, the appeal and the petition to condone delay are not maintainable, especially in the light of S.96(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Division Bench also doubted the earlier view of this Court in L.A.A. Nos. 251 of 2011, 645 of 2012 and 919 of 2009.

4. Heard the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant and learned Additional Advocate General, Sri. Renjith Thamban.

5. The learned Additional Advocate General submitted that, in the instant case, after a decree has been passed, the claimant approached the Lok Adalath and settled the reference case in full and final settlement. In such an event, it shall not be open for the claimant to re-agitate the claim by filing an appeal. On the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel, Sri. T. Krishnanunni, appearing for the appellant submitted that, the appeal being a statutory right, it cannot be said that the appeal cannot be entertained. Whether it is full and final settlement of the award amount and whether the appellant had relinquished his right to prefer the appeal is a matter to be considered in the appeal. In so far as the settlement is with reference to the decree passed in the case, nothing prevents the decree holder to prefer the statutory appeal which has been held so, by different Division Benches.

6. The three appeals referred by the Division Bench in the reference order were the cases in which execution petitions were pending before the execution court for recovering the amount decreed, which were referred to the Adalat and a settlement was arrived at before the Adalat. This Court held that, settling a case before the Adalat in so far as the decree amount is concerned, does not preclude the decree holder from preferring a statutory appeal.

7. First point to be considered is whether S.96(3) of C.P.C. bars the filing of appeal. S.96(3) of the C.P.C. reads as under :

“(3) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties.”

The position of law has been well stated in Katikara Chintamani Dora v. Guntreddi Annamanaidu ((1974) 1 SCC 567) at paragraph 62, which reads as under :

“62. Be that as it may, the bar to an appeal against a consent decree, in sub-section (3) of Section 96 of the Code is based on the broad principle of estoppel. It presupposes that the parties to an action can, expressly or by implication, waive or forego their right of appeal by any lawful agreement or compromise, or even by conduct. Therefore, as soon as the parties made the agreement to abide by the determination in the appeal (A.S.668) and induced the Court to pass a decree in terms of that agreement, the principle of estoppel underlying Section 96(3) became operative and the decree to the extent it was in terms of that agreement, became final and binding between the parties. And, it was as effective in creating an estoppel between the parties as a judgment on contest. Thus, the determination in A.S.668 — that Kadakalla was not an “estate” — became as much binding on the respondents, as on the parties in that appeal.”

In fact the decree dated 27.5.2010 is not one passed by the consent of the parties and therefore S.96(3) will not apply to facts of the present ca