The following substantial questions of law are framed for a decision.

(i) Is the finding of the lower appellate court that there was no Karaima right for the family of appellants in accordance with the law?

(ii) Has the lower appellate court construed the pleadings in accordance with the law?

(iii) Did the first appellate court act in accordance with law in the matter of appreciating the evidence?

(iv) What is the effect of the Kerala Hindu Joint Family System (Abolition Act) 1976 (for short, "the Act") on the claim of parties to the suit?

(v) What are the power of the Cochin Devaswom Board in relation to the rights of the parties?

(vi) Has the 4th respondent any hereditary right to be in office in preference to the appellants.

2. Shorn off frills and embroideries, the dispute concerns right to perform 'Malakazhakam' (preparation of garlands for the deity) in the Peruvanam Sree Mahadeva Temple (for short, "the Temple") which is under the governance of the 1st respondent, the Cochin Devaswom Board (for short, "the Board"). According to the appellants/plaintiffs the right to perform Malakazhakam is vested with the Thekkepisharath Family, of which they are the senior most members. Appellants and 4th respondent are Pisharadies by caste and followed the Marumakkathayam law of succession. It is alleged that remuneration for performance of Malakazhakam was being received from the Board by the then Karanavan of the joint family. While so, Ext.A1, partition deed No.1758 of 1103 ME was executed in the family as per which the right to perform Malakazhakam in the Temple was directed to be performed by the then existing four Thavazhies by rotation for a period of six months each. Name of the senior most male member was shown in the Board records as the person entitled to perform Malakazhakam. On his shifting to Kadampur, in Palakkad District, the name was changed to the name of the late Rama Pisharady, father of the 4th respondent. Two of the four thavazhies represented by respondents 5 to 10 abandoned their right to perform Malakazhakam by waiver. Thereafter the said rite was being performed by the two thavazhies of appellants and the late, Rama Pisharady. After Rama Pisharady who was performing the rite, the next turn was for the appellants. While so, the Board appointed 4th respondent as the person to perform Malakazhakam. Hence the suit for a declaration of right of the appellants to perform Malakazhakam, a mandatory injunction directing the Board to permit 1st appellant to do so and for other reliefs. The Board and its officials (respondents 1 to 3) contended that the right originally vested with the Thekkepisharath Family but after the advent of Act 30 1976, that right has ceased to exist with the said Family as joint family has ceased to exist. Rama Pisharady was performing the rite and after him, the 4th respondent, his son is entitled to be appointed to perform Malakazhakam. The 4th respondent also raised similar contentions.

3. Trial court, relying on the decisions of this Court and the meaning of the expression "Karaima" held that appellants are entitled to the declaration and injunction prayed for and accordingly granted a decree. The 4th respondent challenged that judgment and decree in A.S. No.272 of 2003. Learned Additional District Judge came to the conclusion that though 1st appellant as P.W.1 has referred to various rights and claims and that parties were following Marumakkathayam law of succession, there is no sufficient plea to that effect in the plaint. First appellate court concluded that though according to P.W1, the 5th respondent and later, Rama Pisharady were authorised by the members of the family to receive remuneration on behalf of all who are entitled to perform Malakazhakam, no evidence in that line was let in by the appellants. First appellate court reversed judgment and decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit. That judgment and decree are under challenge in this Second Appeal on the substantial q