The interpretation of the term 'agricultural land' under the SARFAESI Act and the scope of the term 'agriculture' in List II under the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India were deliberated upon, emphasizing that the determination of whether a particular land is to be treated as agricultural land should be made based on the materials available and the facts of the particular case.

Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J.

1. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellants, who challenge the judgment of the learned single Judge dismissing their writ petition. We have also heard the learned counsel for the respondent Bank.

2. The fact that the appellants availed a loan facility is not in dispute. Alleging default and outstanding, the Bank invoked the provisions of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) and took measure to proceed thereunder. The debtors came to this Court when they faced a situation where the Bank did not accede to their contention that the lands covered by the security cannot be proceeded against under the SARFAESI Act because those lands are agricultural lands exempted from the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, in particular, Section 31(i) thereof. The learned single Judge refused to interfere at the instance of the debtors relying on the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court of India in United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tandon [(2010) 8 SCC 110], wherein entertainment of petitions in writ jurisdiction in relation to matters under the SARFAESI Act was held against. On that jurisdictional issue, the learned single Judge held that there is a question of fact, which is in dispute, and therefore, the writ petitioners' option is only to seek remedy under the provisions of the SARFAESI Act.

3. Challenging the judgment of the learned single Judge, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants argued, among other things, that in the judgment of this Court in Muhammed Basheer K.P. v. Deputy General Manager, Kannur District Coop. Bank Ltd. [2010 (2) KHC 385] : [ILR 2010 (2) Kerala 393], this Court has held that the term 'agricultural land' occurring in the section has to be understood in a wider conspectus and that agricultural land is exempted from the provisions of the Securitisation Act, including by reason of inclusion of agriculture in the State List under the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, thereby keeping it out of the legislative domain of the Parliament. He pointed out that certificate of the agricultural officer was provided to show that the land is agricultural in nature.

We have perused the materials. We have seen the communications. It would be advisable that we do not speak anything on our assessment of the contents of those documents as regards the nature of the land because that is a disputed issue and any observation, if made by us in that regard, would only be counter productive to any proceedings in appropriate jurisdictions. The decision in Muhammed Basheer (supra) rendered by this Court was pointing out the issue as to whether rubber plantation is agricultural land. The question that arose was as to whether lands on which rubber plants/trees are growing can be treated as agricultural lands. That appeal arose from a judgment where the view taken was that operations in rubber are predominantly industrial in nature, and therefore, rubber plantation should also be treated as not falling within the term 'agricultural land', for the purpose of Section 31(i) of the SARFAESI Act. In deciding that appeal, the sweep of the term 'agricultural land' in the said Section and the scope of the term 'agriculture' in List II under the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India have also been deliberated upon. However, that decision is not decisive and is not applicable to the question in hand, i.e., as to whether a particular land is to be treated as agricultural land on the materials available and the facts of the particular case. Under such circumstances, we are not inclined to interfere with the decision of the learned single Judge refusing to exercise writ jurisdiction in relation to the SARFAESI matter in hand. This writ appeal is, accordingly, dismissed leaving the appellants with liberty to seek appropriate remedies from the competent Debt Recovery Tribunal in terms of the provisions