The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and application of the Indian Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, XXVI of 1925, and the Limitation Act, Art. 31, in determining the liability for non-delivery of goods by a carrier.

N. Varadaraja Iyengar, J.

This second appeal is filed by defendants 1 and 2 in a suit for compensation for non-delivery of goods by a carrier.

2. The facts may be shortly stated as follows: The Industrial Leather Company Limited, Bombay, shipped from Bombay to Cochin Port a consignment of five bundles of leather goods valued at Rs. 1,039-8-0 on board the ship “S.S. Mount Kyllene” belonging to the 1st defendant Steamer Company in the month of August 1948. On the arrival of the steamer at Cochin Port and the unloading of the cargo the plaintiff’s agents Sitaram Warehouse, Mattancherri, were informed by the 2nd defendant who was the local agent of the 1st defendant that the goods had arrived. Thereupon the plaintiff’s agents handed over the shipping documents and got the delivery order Ext. A on 21st January 1948 from the 2nd defendant. The goods were however not delivered on presentation of the delivery order. The plaintiff then forwarded a bill for the value of the goods and freight with 10 per cent added towards damages and incidental charges. On this the defendants wanted time to investigate but ultimately, after a good deal of correspondence, on 23rd February 1950, plaintiff was informed that his claim in respect of the goods stood rejected because it had been made too late. According to the plaintiff the defendants had been taking time on false pretext and prevented him from seeking remedy earlier. The suit was therefore laid on 5th April 1950 as for compensation for non-delivery of goods and as against both the defendants 1 and 2.

3. Defendants 1 and 2 contested the suit. The 1st defendant rested his defence mainly on a plea of limitation. According to him the goods ought to have been delivered as soon as the ship had arrived at Cochin Port on 6th September 1948. The cause of action for damages for non-delivery should therefore be deemed to have arisen on such date. The suit brought by plaintiff more than one year later must accordingly be held to be barred. Contention was also raised that the plaintiff was not entitled by way of loss of profit to the extent of Rs. 109-2-0 claimed in the plaint. The 2nd defendant denied liability because he was only an agent of the 1st defendant in the whole matter.

4. The trial court decreed the suit as prayed for and this decree has been confirmed by the District Court in appeal by the defendants. Hence this second appeal.

5. The points that arise for consideration are:

(i) whether the plaintiff had lost his remedy by lapse of time;

(ii) whether the plaintiff’s claim for loss of profits was not maintainable; and

(iii) whether the 2nd defendant should have been exonerated from liability.

6. Mr. Rama Iyer, learned Counsel for the special appellants took the first point in this way. The bill of lading which evidenced the contract of carriage in the case incorporated by reference all the terms, provisions and conditions of the Indian Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, XXVI of 1925, and the Schedule thereto. The 1st defendant carrier was in consequence entitled to the benefit of the immunity contained in paragraph 6 of Art. III of the Schedule to the Act, viz.,

“In any event the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within one year after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should have been delivered.”

The date when the goods ought to have been delivered within the meaning of this clause could not under any circumstance, go beyond 9th September 1948 when the ship left the Cochin Port. Plaintiff’s claim by way of suit was only on 5th April 1950 and therefore he could not have any remedy. Alternatively and assuming Art. 31 of the Limitation Act applied the terminus a quo must be computed from the date when the goods ought to have been delivered which again was 9th September 1949 at the latest and this was so irrespective of the correspondence that ensued between the parties after that date, and the suit would then have