IMPORTANT POINTS
• Section 22 of the SICA,1985 is not a complete bar ousting jurisdiction of Civil Court but it is only a partial bar demanding compliance of certain requirement that no suit shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with the consent of the board or as the case may be, the appellate authority. When there is non compliance of the said requirement, the proceedings and everything attached to it and even the right to sue would stand as suspended by virtue of operation of Section 22(3) of the Act.
• While dealing with the scope of Section 22 read with Section 16 and 17 of SICA 1985, took the view that all proceedings for execution, distress or the like against the properties of the company would automatically be suspended and could not continue without the consent of BIFR.

The defendant came up with this appeal, against decree and judgment of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court granting a decree for recovery of an amount of Rs.93,624/- being the salary arrears commencing from July,1993 to February 1994 due to the plaintiff.

2. The dispute is with respect to the application of Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (for short SICA, 1985) and the bar of jurisdiction in dealing with the matter by a Civil Court.

3. Admittedly the suit was brought up for recovery of arrears of salary. There is concurrent finding by both the courts below regarding the amount due by way of salary and no sufficient reason brought to the notice of this court to interfere with the said finding on fact.

4. Ext.B5 is the scheme constituted under Section 17 of the SICA,1985, by which the bar under Section 22 came into effect as on the date of suit. It was submitted by the respondent that the company was revived during the pendency of second appeal and thereby the company was brought out of the scheme under Section 17 and the bar under Section 22 of the SICA, 1985. Hence the decree of both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court are valid and the bar under Section 22 would not come into play, it was argued. The subsequent development admitted by both the counsel that the company was revived during the pendency of this appeal and that at present the bar under Section 22 of SICA,1985 not available. But it is also submitted by the learned counsel Sri.G.Unnikrishnan that since there was application of Section 22 of SICA,1985 as on the date of suit and on the date of decree of both the trial court and the First appellate court, the same can only be regarded as nullity in the eye of law and not capable of acquiring any legal sanctity based on a subsequent development. It was alsosubmitted that when the decree found to be a nullity, it will not have any legal effect and not capable of revival,though the bar under Section 22 of SICA, 1985 subsequently ceased to have effect on the subject matter. Inorder resolve the issue it is necessary to consider the following questions:-

(i)Whether the bar under Section 22 read with Section 16 and 17 of SICA, 1985 would continue to operate against the proceedings initiated before a Civil Court, when the company revived and became a non sick industrial company during its pendency?

(ii) What would be the legal effect of two decrees suffered by the company both in the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court and whether it would be a nullity in the eye of law, by virtue of express bar under Section 22 of SICA,1985?

(iii) When the decree found to be hit by a statutory bar, what would be the effect of a subsequent development which would take away the debarring provision? Is there any difference in the legal position, when the decree not attained finality?

(iv) What would be the legal effect of absence of equal and efficacious alternative remedy attached/connected with a statutory bar?

(v) What would be the jurisdiction with a civil court when there is an express statutory bar and whether it is not within the jurisdiction of a civil court to decide the application of a statutory bar ?

5. It was submitted by Sri.G.Unnikrishnan that when there is a bar either express or implied, a decree granted by the Civil Court is a nullity and may not have any legal consequences by relying on the decisions of the Apex Court in (i) Managing Director, Bhoruka Textiles Limited v. Kashmiri Rice Industries (2009 (7) SCC 521) (ii) Ghansyam Sardav. M/s Shiv Shankar Trading Co. and others (AIR 2015 SC 403) (iii) Chief Engineer, Hydel Project and others v. Ravinder Nath and other (2008 KHC 4142) (iv) Reheja Universal Limited v. NRC Limited and others (2012 (4) SCC 148) and a Division Benchdecision of this Court in Hameed v. Ittoop (1970 KLT 501).

6. Whether an adjudication or a decree by a Civil Court would be a nullity depends on the question whether there is 'inherent lac